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The aim of every political constitution is, or ought to be, 
first to obtain for rulers men who possess most wisdom to 
discern, and most virtue to pursue, the common good of 
the society; --and in the next place, to take the most 
effectual precautions for keeping them virtuous whilst 
they continue to hold their public trust. 
James Madison 
Let me add that a bill of rights is what the people are 
entitled to against every government on earth, general or 
particular, and what no just government should refuse .•• 
Thomas Jefferson 
Introduction 
The inauguration of Hauro I. Remeliik as President of the Republic of Palau, 
on 31 January 1981, rounds off twenty years of constitution-making and political 
change in the Pacific Region. In 1962 Western Samoa became independent, 
shedding New Zealand's rule. It has been followed towards independence, or self-
government "in free association" with another entity, by virtually all of the other 
islands of Melanesia, Micronesia and Polynesia. In French Polynesia and New 
Caledonia new statutes providing for enlarged (though far from complete) internal 
autonomy were granted in 1977. Further political change seems imminent in the 
wake of political disturbances in New Caledonia, changing political alignments in 
French Polynesia, and the election in France of a Socialist Government. 
Elsewhere Pacific .peoples now govern themselves, under often elaborate 
constitutional frameworks derived from Western political tradition. With the onset 
of self-rule in Palau, under its own Constitution, the time is ripe to take a broad 
look at Pacific constitutions, and the institutions and processes which t~ey seek to 
establish and preserve. While there has been much rhetoric about a "Pacific Way," 
it will be interesting to discover whether twenty years of political initiative, 
centering on the development of constitutional frameworks for self-rule, has 
produced diversity rather than uniformity in the islands' political approaches to 
their often common problems. 
Constitutions As Problem-Solving Documents 
Pacific entities have been almost unanimous in electing to organize their 
political structures utilizing a written Constitution. In so doing, of course, Pacific 
leaders have been guided not only by the advice of their departing rulers but, in 
some instances, by political necessity. A major component of the independence 
bargain between the British and their Pacific colonies was agreement on the terms 
of a written Constitution which was, in turn, submitted for approval within a 
British statute to the Parliament in London. Similarly, progress towards self-rule 
in Micronesia has been very significantly intertwined with the development of 
constitutions compatible with American intentions and preferences. 
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These pressures no doubt played a role in shaping not merely the detailed 
provisions of Pacific constitutional documents but the very decision to govern 
through such a document at all. In many ways this has been a quite ironic 
development, for constitutions are neither necessary nor sufficient for good 
government. Elsewhere in the world, the most elaborate of these contrivances has 
not been able to prevent determined leaders, or well-organized parties, from 
departing from their provisions or dispensing with the Constitution altogether. 
Moreover, government disciplined by written documents represents a departure 
from traditional Pacific approaches to governance, and although the problems of 
contemporary society are complex and intractable, the fundamental dilemmas of 
politics are much the same in every time and place. Finally, it is curious that the 
British and the New Zealanders, in particular, proved so insistent that their Pacific 
charges not receive independence, or progress to self-rule, without the support of a 
written Constitution. For although the overwhelming majority of the world's 
polities do govern through written Constitutions, the British and the New 
Zealanders express a certain pride in doing without these encumbrances. There 
may therefore be a certain paternalism symbolized by their determination not to 
depart from their Pacific colonies without providing a constitutional legacy. It 
appears that responsible decision makers in these two colonial powers' concluded 
that while their own countries were experienced enough in democratic governance 
to function pragmatically, it was vital that, in the absence of colonial masters 
ski11ed in such matters, the rules be written down as indelibly as possible for 
Pacific islanders to study, observe <l:nd follow. 
Pacific Constitutions have been designed as problem-solving documents. 
They are organized, as are all Constitutions, to confront a series of problems 
which all political systems must resolve in order to endure. These problems, 
moreover, are taken up sequentially within each Pacific Constitution. Immersed in 
the details of constitutional r:ninutiae are responses to fundamental challenges in 
any political entity anywhere in the world. Some of these might best be expressed 
in interrogative form. How will political leaders be chosen? Will it be possible to 
provide for a peaceful, orderly succession when leaders prove unsatisfactory, or 
die? What role will the State play in island affairs? What limitations may be 
placed on State power? How may new laws be introduced, old laws modified or 
abolished, any laws interpreted and enforced? Who are the people to be governed 
together as a political community? May new groups join, existing ones leave? 
What are the goals of the people to which constitutional Government must now be 
dedicated? 
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The constitutions of the contemporary Pacific reflect the power relationships 
in place within Pacific societies when independence, or self-government, came to 
be achieved. They embody the consensus of governing elites within Pacific polities, 
modified in certain instances by the preferences of the departing colonial power. 
These constitutions provide formal answers to the basic questions of politics in the 
Pacific as elsewhere: who governs, for what purposes, through what procedures. 
Goals and Symbols-The Purposes of Pacific Political Communities 
Pacific constitutions are eloquent in their identification of national goals and 
the symbols which express them. The opening passages of Pacific Constitutions 
articulate the goals, ideals and national purposes to which the Constitution, and the 
political community whose processes it describes, are dedicated. This opening 
portion, common to alJ recent Pacific Constitutions (Niue and the Cook Islands 
excepted), is known as the Preamble. 
Preambles reflect constitutional origins. They articulate a consensus about 
national goals, while at the same time demonstrating the unique excitement that 
surrounds the birth of any new country. They are products of an irreplaceable 
national enthusiasm, whether they introduce the Constitution of a new state or the 
new Constitution of an older polity. Often, though not in the Pacific, preambles 
establish the goals of a new regime brought to power by illegal (and often violent) 
means, a regime eager to celebrate, legitimize and extend its achievements. The 
new rulers seek to use the Constitution to imprint their own personal brand of 
politics upon the nation's fundamental law. 
The Pacific Island Constitutions which form the backdrop of this essay were 
each written to accompany the birth of a new nation or, alternatively, the re-
emergence to sovereignty of an old one. Release from colonial rule, enlargement 
of national dignity, and the opportunity to develop political solutions free from 
external control have been developments of singular significance for Pacific 
peoples. Their Constitutions exhibit the excitement occasioned by independence 
best in their preambles •. 
The flavor of some of these opening declarations can be appreciated by a few 
examples. The Preamble to the Constitution of the Marshall Islands is especially 
eloquent. 
3 
WE, THE PEOPLE OF THE MARSHALL ISLANDS, trusting in God, the 
Giver of our life, liberty, identity and our inherent rights, do hereby 
exercise these rights and establish for ourselves and generations to 
come this Constitution, setting forth the legitimate legal framework for 
the governance of the Marshall Islands. We have reason to be proud of 
our forefathers who boldly ventured across the unknown waters of the 
vast Pacific Ocean many centuries ago, ably responding to the constant 
challenges of maintaining a bare existence on these tiny islands, in their 
noble quest to build their own distinctive society. This society has 
survived, and has withstood the test of time, the impact of other 
cultures, the devastation of war, and the high price paid for the 
purposes of international peace and security. All we have and are today 
as a people, we have received as a sacred heritage which we pledge 
ourselves to safeguard and maintain, valuing nothing more dearly than 
our rightful home on these islands. With this Constitution, we affirm 
our desire and right to live in peace and harmony, subscribing to the 
principles of democracy, sharing the aspirations of all other peoples for 
a free and peaceful world, and striving to do all we can to assist in 
achieving this goal. We extend to other peoples what we profoundly 
seek from them: peace, friendship, mutual understanding, and respect 
for our individual idealism and our common humanity.1 
The Fiji Constitution begins with a preamble describing the nineteenth 
ceritury acceptance by the Chiefs of British rule, notes the economic and political 
advancement of "all the peoples of Fiji •.. united under a common bond," and 
closes with a statement of the people's "unshakeable belief that all are entitled to 
fundamental human rights and freedoms based upon and secured by the rule of law . 
.. " The Federated States of Micronesia (FSM hereafter) Constitution commences 
with a review of recent history. 
To make one nation of many islands, we respect the diversity of our 
cultures. Our differences enrich us. The seas bring us together, they do 
not separate us. Our islands sustain us, our island nation enlarges us and 
makes us stronger. Our ancestors, who made their homes on these 
; 
islands, displaced no other people. We, who remain, wish no other home 
than this. Having known war, we hope for peace. Having been divided, 
we wish unity. Having been ruled, we seek freedom. Micronesia began 
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in the days when man explored seas in rafts and canoes. The 
Micronesian nation is born in an age when men voyage among stars; our 
world itself is an island. We extend to all nations what we seek from 
each: peace, friendship, cooperation, and love in our common humanity. 
With this Constitution we, who have been the ward of other nations, 
become the proud guardian of our own islands, now and forever. 
The closely related concluding phraseology in theFSM and Marshalls' 
preambles reflects not merely the imitative character of constitution-writing, but 
as well the shared history of these two entities as they emerge separately, although 
almost simultaneously, from American trusteeship. The values of Pacific leaders 
are reflected in the common emphasis on cooperation and r:espect for tradition. At 
the same time, difficulties associated with governing multi-island nations scattered 
across vast distances of ocean account in no small measure for the emphasis on 
unity. The Second World War struggle between Japan and the United States is 
reflected too in the Micronesians' plea to be left alone, to live in peace. 
Thus these preambles reflect the recent historical experience of the countries 
concerned as well as the political predicaments faced now and for the foreseeable 
future •. 
Some preambles carry a religious message, befitting the customs and 
traditions of the people concerned. Western Samoa's Constitution begins thusly: 
IN THE HOLY NAME OF GOD, THE ALMIGHTY, THE EVER LOVING 
Whereas sovereignty over the Universe belongs to the Omnipresent God 
alone, and the authority to be exercised by the people of Western Samoa 
within the limits prescribed by His commandments is a sacred heritage; 
WHEREAS the Leaders of Western Samoa have declared that Western 
Samoa should be an Independent State based on Christian principles and 
Samoan custom and tradition; AND WHEREAS the Constitutional 
Convention, representing the people of Western Samoa, has resolved to 
frame a constitution for the Independent State of Western Samoa; 
WHEREIN The State should exercise its powers and authority through 
the chosen representatives of the people; WHEREIN should be secured 
to all the people their fundamental rights; WHEREIN the impartial 
administration of justice should be fully maintained; AND WHEREIN the 
integrity of Western Samoa, its independence, and all its rights should 
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be safeguarded; NOW THEREFORE, we the people of Western Samoa in 
our Constitutional Convention, this twenty-eight day of October 1960, 
do hereby adopt, enact, and give to ourselves this Constitution. 
The Constitution of Nauru makes a similar commitment to fundamental, 
unifying, religious principles. 
WHEREAS we the people of Nauru acknowledge God as the almighty 
and everlasting Lord and the giver of all good things: AND WHEREAS 
we humbly place ourselves under the protection of His good providence 
and seek His blessing upon ourselves and upon our lives; AND WHEREAS 
we have declared that Nauru shall be a republic; AND WHEREAS a 
Constitutional Convention representing us has prepared a Constitution 
for Nauru: NOW THEREFORE we the people of Nauru in our 
Constitutional Convention this twenty-ninth day of January, One 
thousand nine hundred and sixty-eight, do hereby adopt, enact and give 
to ourselves this Constitution to come into force on the thirty-first day 
of January, One thousand nine hundred and sixty-eight. 
Other Constitutions begin by asserting inviolable principles to guide future 
decision-makers. The Constitution of Kiribati, following a "We the people" 
opening, goes on to say that 
In implementing this Constitution, we declare that 
1. the will of the people shall ultimately be paramount in the conduct of the 
government of Kiribati; 
2. the principles of equalityand justice shall be upheld; 
3. the natural resources of Kiribati are vested in the people and their 
Government; 
4. we shall continue to cherish and uphold the customs and traditions of 
Kiribati. 
Entrenching these kinds of value commitments in the Constitution may not 
guarantee that present or future political leaders will always be guided by them in 
reviewing development projects or allocating budgetary resources. However, 
articulating these values in this way does make explicit underlying principles which 
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may reassure traditional leaders and others uncertain about the advantages of self-
government and political separation from Great Britain. Realizing this is a further 
reminder that Constitutions are primarily political documents, sensitive to the 
anxieties and aspirations of the people affected by them. 
The Solomon Islands Constitution notes the people's pride in "the wisdom and 
the worthy customs" of their ancestors and their present realization of "our 
common destiny." Declaring "as a basis of our united nation" the principles that 
power belongs to the people "and is exercised on their behalf" by political 
institutions, and that the "natural resources" of the Solomons are "vested in the 
people and the government," the draftsmen went on to "agree and pledge" five 
basic "purposes" for which the Constitution-and, by inference, the 
Government-has been established. 
(a) our government shall be based on democratic principles of universal 
suffrage and the responsibility of executive authorities to elect assemblies; 
(b) we shall uphold the principles of equali ty, social justice and the equitable 
distribution of incomes; 
(c) we shall respect and enhance human dignity and strengthen a)1d build on 
our communal solidarity; 
(d) we shall cherich and promote the different cultural traditions within 
Solomon Islands; 
(e) we shall ensure the participation of our people in the governance of their 
affairs and provide within the framework of our national unity for the 
decentralisation of power: 
AND for these purposes we now give ourselves this Constitution. 
The Papua New Guinea preamble pays homage to the values of unity, 
tradition ("ancestors-the sources of our strength and origin of our combined 
heritage"), Christian principles, independence, freedom, popular sovereignty ("all 
power belongs to the people"), community, national identity, peace ("we reject 
violence and seek consensus as a means of solving our common problems"), and 
equality ("that our national wealth, won by honest, hard work be equitably shared 
by all"). However, this Constitution is unique in the contemporary Pacific, for its 
preamble goes on to establish a series of "National Goals and Directive Principles," 
"Basic Rights," and "Basic Social Obligations," all of these preceding the operative 
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articles of the document. These goals, principles, rights and obligations are 
elaborate extensions of the basic idea of a preamble: to establish the legal basis 
for, and the fundamental purposes of, the Constitution itself. 
Stylistically, Pacific Constitutional preambles have been of two types: the 
"we the people" kind, most common in American-influenced entities but not 
confined to these, and the "whereas" form, which establishes a linked argument and 
is most prevalent in the British-influenced entities. The Constitution of Tuvalu is a 
good example of the latter, the style with which New Zealanders might be expected 
to feel most comfortable. 
WHEREAS the Islands in the Pacific Ocean then known as the Ellice 
Islands came under the protection of Her Most Gracious Mc:.jesty Queen 
Victoria in September 1892 and on 12th January 1916 in conjunction 
with the Gilbert Islands became known as the Gilbert and Ellice Islands 
Colony; 
AND WHEREAS on 1st October 1975 Her Most Excellent Majesty 
Queen Elizabeth II was graciously pleased to establish the Ellice Islands 
as a separate colony under their ancient name of Tuvalu; 
AND WHEREAS the people of Tuvalu, acknowledging God as the 
Almighty and Everlasting Lord and giver of all good things, humbly 
place themselves under His good providence and seek His blessing upon 
themselves and their lives; 
AND WHEREAS the people of Tuvalu desire to constitute 
themselves as an Independent State based on Christian principles, the 
Rule of Law, and Tuvaluan custom and tradition; 
NOW THEREFORE the people of Tuvalu hereby affirm their 
allegiance to her Most Excellent Majesty Queen Elizabeth II, Her Heirs 
and Successors, and do hereby proclaim the establishment of a free and 
democratic sovereign nation, of which the following provisions shall 
form the Constitution. 
As is evident from this review, the preamble-often the only part of a 
Constitution which the people can quote from memory-expresses collective goals 
and values. It may also summarize a nation's history, its cultural outlook, its ethnic 
basis. The historical statement may be succeeded by a brief accumulation of 
8 
values designed to provide an unarguable framework for constitutional government. 
Preambles which (by contrast) imbed disputed points of politics or history make the 
Constitution itself an object of partisan maneuvering, rather than a document 
whose preliminary commitments reflect a consensus about basic principles and 
ultimate goals. 
NATIONAL SYMBOLS AND CONSTITUTIONAL SUPREMACY 
Preambles are often followed by provisions (known as a "supremacy clause") 
which declare the Constitution to be "the supreme law" of the country. The Tuvalu 
Constitution, for example, displays a "Chapter I. THE STATE AND THE 
CONSTITUTION" following the above-mentioned preamble and preceding the 
second chapter, the Bill of Rights. Chapter I declares: 
1. Tuvalu shall be a sovereign democratic State. 
2. This Constitution is the supreme law of Tuvalu and if any other law is 
inconsistent with this Constitution, that other law shall, to the extent of 
the inconsistency, be void. 
Declaring that a Constitu.tion is "supreme" implies, of course, that other laws or 
regulations inconsistent with it are without legal basis and are thus null and void. 
An almost identical first chapter is found in the Constitutions of the Solomon 
Islands (which adds, however, that "Her Majesty shall be the Head of State"), 
Kiribati, Nauru (described in part 1 as "an independent republic"), Western Samoa 
(with a section describing its national territory, discussed below), Fiji, Vanuatu, and 
the Marshall Islands. Constitutional geography may also be found in the opening 
section of the document. Description of the nation-state and its physical 
boundaries seems logical, since it defines the area of coverage of the Constitution. 
At the same time, it may be presumed to be unnecessary, from one point of view, 
as omission of such a description is not likely to prevent a Constitution-and the 
laws enacted under it-from being applied to the inhabitants of the polity to which 
it refers. 
Immediately after the preamble, Part I of the Constitution of Western Samoa 
reads: 
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1. (1) The Independent State of Western Samoa (hereinafter referred to as 
Western Samoa) shall be free and sovereign. 
(2) Western Samoa shall comprise the islands of Upolu, Savai'i, Manono, 
and Apolima in the South Pacific Ocean, together with all other 
islands adjacent thereto and lying between the 13th and 15th 
degrees of south latitude and the 171st and 173rd degrees of 
longitude west of Greenwich. 
The Constitution of the FSM contains a more elaborate statement on the 
"Territory of Micronesia" in its first Article. This statement reflects not only 
greater uncertainty about the number of entities likely to participate in this 
federation, but also an effort by lawyers to draft language likely to enhance the 
FSM's resources. 
SECTION 1. The territory of the (FSM) is comprised of the Districts of 
the Micronesian archipelago that ratify this Constitution. Unless 
limited by international treaty obligations assumed by the (FSM), or by 
its own act, the waters connecting the islands of the archipelago are 
internal waters regardless of dimensions, and jurisdiction extends to a 
marine space of 200 miles measured outward from appropriate 
baselines, the seabed, subsoil, water column, insular or continental 
shelves, airspace over land and water, and any other territory or waters 
belonging to Micronesia by historic right, custom, or legal title. 
SECTION 2. Each state is comprised of the islands of each District as 
defined by laws in effect immediately prior to the effective date of this 
Constitution. A marine boundary between adjacent states is determined 
by law, applying the principle of equidistance. State boundaries may be 
changed by Congress with the consent of the state legislatures involved. 
The remainder of this Article dealing with the nat~onal territory addresses a 
question of interest to some polities, but omitted from most Constitutions. The 
following two sections of the FSM Constitution develop procedures by which the 
national territory-that is, the area of coverage of the Constitution-may be 
enlarged. 
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SECTION 3. Territory may be added to the (FSM) upon approval of 
Congress, and by vote of the inhabi tants of the area, if any, and by vote 
of the p~ople of the (FSM). If the territory is to become part of an 
existing state, approval of the state legislature is required. 
SECTION 4-. New states may be formed and admitted by law, subject to 
the same rights, duties, and obligations as provided for in this 
Constitution. 
The Constitution does not provide any procedures for loss of territory, a gap 
not likely to deter any geographically concentrated dissident group from seceding if 
it has the power and will do so. The Palau Constitution, which includes a 
meticulous description of the national territory, is not so reticer.t about the 
prospect of losing any of it: "No state may secede from Palau." 
The Fiji Constitution leaves the definition of "Fiji" to "Chapter XI-Miscella-
neous," in which it is declared: 
'Fiji' means the territories which immediately before 10th October 1970 
constituted the colony of Fiji and includes any other territori,es declared 
by Parliament to form part of Fiji; 
This is a neat, tidy, and pragmatic approach likely to appeal to persons 
impatient with precise geographical measurement. Others might prefer a 
Constitutional statement which included a claim to resources far from the nation'S 
land mass (comparable in intent to the Act of Parliament creating a 200-mlJe 
economic zone). Some Constitutions omit a description, or a definition, of the 
country altogether, presumably on the grounds that the inhabitants from whom all 
constitutional authority flows will know who and where they are. What 
Constitutions do not omit, however, is the supremacy clause. 
Constitutions will often contain descriptions of emotionally powerful political 
symbols representative of the national self-image. These evocations of national 
unity are intended to embody the national purpose, to weld a people together within 
a single political community. They may include a coat of arms, a national bird, a 
constitutionally approved flower. Constitutional flora and fauna are by no means 
unusual, although their absence from Pacific island documents may suggest that 
these sorts of constitutional decoration (found in American State Constitutions, for 
example) may be going out of fashion. 
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The national anthem-or national song-may be mentioned in the Consti-
tution too, and there may be included as well a description of the national flag 
(including an explanation for the colors and shapes selected to appear upon this 
emblem of nationhood). The Tongan Constitution (approved in 1875) states that 
The Flag of Tonga (the flag of King George) shall never be altered but 
shall always be the flag of this Kingdom and the present Royal Ensign 
shall always be the ensign of the Royal Family of Tonga. 
The Cook Islands Constitution (adopted in 1964 by the New Zealand 
Parliament) was bereft of preamble and political symbols, unless the "Public Seal of 
the Cook Islands" (kept "in the custody of the High Commissioner"), used "for the 
authentication of any public document in relation to the government of the Cook 
Islands," is included in such a category. Since self-government, c;ymbols of 
nationhood have become inextricably mixed with symbols of partisanship, so that 
during the 1965-78 period, the" Cook Islands flag was in fact the flag of the Cook 
Islands Party. During 1981 amendments have been proposed by the governing party, 
the Democrats, to entrench in the Constitution a new Cook Islands Flag and a Cook 
Islands national anthem. Thus, the "Cook Islands Ensign is hereby declared to be 
the recognized flag of the Cook Islands," while the "anthem entitled 'Te A tua Mou 
E' shall be the national anthem of the Cook Islands." The words of this anthem are 
included in the Constitution, and the ensign is described as follows: 
The Cook Islands Ensign shall be a Royal blue ensign. The Union 
Jack shall occupy the upper staff quarter, having on the fly 15 stars in a 
symmetrical ring, all of equal size and equal spacing, and the colour of 
the stars shall be white. The flag proportion of length to breadth shall 
be of two to one. And it shall mean--Blue--is the colour most 
expressive of our Nation, it is respresentative of the vast area of the 
Pacific Ocean in which the islands of the Cook Islands are scattered. 
Blue also depicts the peaceful nature of the inhabitants of our islands. 
Union Jack--indicates our historical association with and membership of 
the British Commonwealth. The 15 white stars represent the 15 islands 
of the group. 
In some Pacific polities, national contests have been held to select a new song, or 
design a new flag. Elaborating the symbols of nationhood might be seen both by 
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governmg elites and public alike as a constructive exercise, one which seeks to 
legitimise the nation's new political status. Elites may seek to promote a deepened 
awareness of the cultural origins and identity of the newly sovereign polity as well 
as (in certain instances) draw attention to issues of environmental protection and 
enhancement. 
THE BILL OF RIGHTS 
With the exception of the Cook Islands and Niue, Pacific polities moved to 
their present political status with a Constitution containing a Bill of Rights. In the 
Cook Islands, 1981 witnessed a significant period of constitutional innovation, with 
a Bill of Rights being presented to the Legislative Assembly as an amendment to 
the Constitution provided by New Zealand. The various components of the virtually 
obsolescent American Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (Micronesia), the 
Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas, the Marshall Islands, Palau and the 
Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) are each equipped with full constitutional 
paraphernalia, as will be the various state governments being born in Palau and the 
FSM. 
One perhaps obvious point which emerges from a review of these documents 
is that a Bill of Rights is invariably a component of a written Constitution. This is 
the case in nearly every country in the world (the U.K. being a significant 
exception) and is the case for all of the political entities in the Pacific. In none of 
them does a Bill of Rights exist separately from, or in the absence of, a written 
Constitution. While Niue has a Constitution but no Bill of Rights, there is no 
example of the opposite being the case. 
A Bill of Rights is not a Constitution, however, these documents· serve 
complementary, but distinct, functions. A Bill of Rights contains provisions which 
form part of a general code designed to regulate and discipline the exercise of 
State power. A Bill of Rights is a part of a Constitution-but a very special part. 
The Constitution as a whole makes contributions to the task of controlling State 
power, but the kinds of restrictions imposed in a Bill of Rights are of an 
extraordinary and vital kind. 
This is recognized within the Constitutions of the Pacific nations themselves. 
In many cases, it is more difficult to amend, alter or abolish a Bill of Rights, or 
portion thereof, than to change other provisions of a Constitution. The Bill of 
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Rights is given special importance by Constitution-writers in another striking, yet 
obvious, way. Quite simply, the Bill of Rights comes first! It precedes the other 
formal provisions of Pacific· Constitutions (the preamble and supremacy clause 
excepted). 
The lengthy and often eloquent Bill of Rights found in the Second Article, or 
Chapter, of most Pacific island Constitutions contains provisions which almost 
without exception have as their conceptual source the American Bill of Rights 
(added to the American Constitution after its acceptance and approval by the 
American States). The language, however, is modernized in these contemporary 
versions, and, in some instances, two hundred years of American judicial 
interpretation of the relevant provisions has been taken into account by the 
authors. In addition, many of these Bills of Rights-to many people, the heart of 
the Constitution-include guarantees and protections embracing categories of 
behavior not found in Bills of Rights of greater antiquity. A further interesting 
feature of Pacific charters is the tendency found in several of them to include 
provisions describing, and seeking to protect, the "traditional" rights of the people. 
Most Bills of Rights contain two distinct kinds of guarantees. One relates to 
basic "freedoms"; these seek to defend areas of individual behavior against 
Government interference. The other deals with aspects of judicial procedure. 
While these provisions too are designed to protect the individual against arbitrary 
treatment by Government authorities, they relate more to individual behavior in 
extraordinary circumstances-arrest, trial and punishment-than to the substance 
of individual behavior and social interaction in "ordinary" situations. 
Part II of the Western Samoan Constitution enumerates "Fundamental Rights" 
enjoyed by all persons, while providing remedies for "enforcement of rights" open 
to "any person." These rights include: life, personal liberty, freedom from inhuman 
treatment, freedom from forced labor, a fair trial, rights "concerning criminal 
law," religion, rights "concerning religious instruction," speech, assembly, associa-
tion, movement and residence ("All citizens ... shall have the right to move freely 
throughout Western Samoa and to reside in any part thereof."), rights "regarding 
property," and freedom from discriminatory legislation ("All persons are equal 
before the law and entitled to equal protection under the law.") 
The Fijian Constitution, while including many of the rights and freedoms 
noted above, includes: very detailed provisions regulating the compulsory 
acquisition of property by the State; protection for privacy of home and other 
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property; protection of persons detained under emergency laws. For the most part, 
these declarations on individual rights seek to guarantee a range of fundamental 
freedoms while at the same time permitting a wide range of police powers to 
continue. to function in the interests of public order. In so doing, many provisions 
become remarkably complicated, as the various exceptions and contingencies 
requiring an abridgement of a right are enumerated. 
An example of this effort to achieve balance between individual autonomy 
and collective power is found in the very first provision of the Bill of Rights of the 
Marshall Islands' Constitution. It begins boldly: 
Every person has the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and belief; to 
freedom of speech and of the press; to the free exercise of religion; to 
freedom of peaceful assembly and association; and to petition the government 
for a redress of grievances. 
However: 
Nothing in this Section shall be construed to invalidate reasonable restrictions 
imposed by law on the time, place, or manner of conduct, provided' 
(a) the restrictions are necessary to preserve public peace, order, health, or 
security or the rights or freedoms of others; 
(b) there exist no less restrictive means of doing so; and 
(c) the restrictions do not penalize conduct on the basis of disagreement with 
the ideas or beliefs expressed. 
In this and in subsequent provisions, the drafters of this Bill of Rights have 
sought to express in plain language a commitment to certain cherished values, 
while at the same time incorporating as succinctly as possible the boundaries for 
the expression of these values likely to be upheld by Courts in adjudicating 
conflicts. Clearly the authors have sought to anticipate (and, possibly, forestall) 
constitutional interpretation by writing, in the Bill of Rights itself, the kinds of 
judicial adjustments most likely to be made in any event. This has been done, in 
most instances, in language as sympathetic as possible to the value-or 
fIr ight"-being protected. 
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The Marshalls' Bill of Rights is an extensive one indeed. It includes: freedom 
of thought, speech, press, religion, assembly, association, and petition; protections 
against slavery and involuntary servitude; protections against "unreasonable search 
and seizure"; right to due process and fair trial (with a ten-section description of 
the rights and procedures associated with these complementary concepts); right to 
just compensation for land taken for public use; protection against "cruel and 
unusual punishment"; right" to a writ of habeas corpus; protection against 
punishment due to ex post facto laws (retrospective legislation) or bills of attainder 
(which identify for punishment a named or "readily identifiable" person or group); 
protection against being compelled to provide lodgings for soldiers; protection 
against imprisonment for debt; right to conscientious objection in the event of 
conscription; right to equal protection under the law, and freedom from 
discrimination; right to personal autonomy and privacy ("All persons shall be free 
from unreasonable interference in personal choices that do not injure others and 
from unreasonable intrusions into their privacy"); right to participate in the 
electoral process, and to use the judicial process "as a means of vindicating any 
interest preserved or created by law, subject only to regulations which limit access 
tOo courts on a non-discriminatory basis"; right to "health care, education, and legal 
services"; "right to responsible" and ethical government"; "other rights" not 
enumerated in the Constitution. 
The Pacific islands Bills of Rights are not always so comprehensive, or so 
sweeping, as the Marshalls'. The Marshalls document is interesting too because its 
fin(ll few rights were neither protections from Government action, nor judicial 
safeguards, but were rather commands to Government to carry out functions, and 
provide services, defined as fundamental "rights" of all people. Enumerating goals 
and objectives of Government policy is not often found in Pacific Bills of Rights, 
however much the idea of a "right" to health care, education, legal services, ethical 
government, environmental protection, privacy, employment, and other values and 
qualities associated with a decent life may now form part of a world-wide popular 
culture. 
The Niue Constitution (enacted by the New Zealand Parliament in 1974.) and 
the Cook Islands Constitution have lacked formal statements of rights, reflecting 
the preferences of their New Zealand advisors who adhered to the notion that 
parliamentary power ought not to be so restrained. However, the proposed 
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amendments to the Cook Islands Constitution, in 1981, do include for the first time 
a, Bill of Rights for Cook Islanders. It is a succinct, but binding, statement of 
"fundamental human rights and freedoms." 
It is hereby recognised and declared that in the Cook Islands there exist and 
shall continue to exist, without discrimination by reason of race, national 
origin, colour, religion, opinion, belief, or sex, the following fundamental 
human rights and freedoms: 
(a) the right of the individual to life, liberty, and security of the person, 
and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with law: 
(b) the right of the individual to equality before the law and to the 
protection of the law: 
(c) the right of the individual to own property, and the right not to be 
deprived thereof except in accordance with law: 
Provided that nothing in this paragraph . • . shall be construed as 
limiting the power of Parliament to prohibit or restrict by Act the 
alienation of Native land •.. 
(d) Freedom of thought, conscience, and religion: 
(e) Freedom of speech and expression: 
(f) Freedom of peaceful assembly and association. 
This attempt to place limitations on the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy 
was in turn qualified by a second section relating to the exercise of these "rights 
and freedoms." 
It is hereby recognised and declared that every person has duties to others, 
and accordingly is subject in the exercise of his rights and freedoms to such 
limitations as are imposed, by any enactment or rule of law for the time 
being in force, for protecting the rights and freedoms of others or in the 
interests of public safety, order, or morals, the general welfare, or the 
security of the Cook Islands. 
Following this section is a lengthier passage detailing the protections 
individuals may expect in judicial proceedings. Other Pacific polities following the 
parliamentary model, based on British practice, have also chosen to depart from 
British and New Zealand practice by governing with written Constitutions 
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containing formal statements of individual rights. The second Chapter of the 
Tuvalu Constitution protects "fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual," 
including "protection for the privacy of his home and other property," "freedom of 
conscience," "freedom of expression," "protection of freedom of assembly and 
association," "protection of freedom of movement," protection against discrimi-
nation, and lengthy protections to be invoked in judicial settings. This section of 
the Constitution extends to eighteen separate sections, running to fourteen pages. 
Other former British possessions in the Pacific devote comparable attention to the 
protection of indivfdual rights and the elaboration of procedures for the defense of 
accused persons. These include Kiribati, Fiji, and the Solomon Islands. Nauru and 
Papua New Guinea, which employ parliamentary institutions, also include in their 
Constitutions elaborate statements of rights and protections. Unexpectedly, the 
American-influenced FSM includes the briefest "Declaration of Rights" of any of 
the Pacific entities (Niue and the French possessions, New Caledonia and French 
Polynesia, excepted, as these remain silent on such matters). It is fifteen 
sentences in length, organized into thirteen separate sections. 
SECTION 1. No law may deny or impair freedom of expression, 
peaceable assembly, association, or petition. 
SECTION 2. No law may be passed respecting an establishment of 
religion or impairing the free exercise of religion, except that 
assistance may be provided to parochial schools for non-religious 
purposes. 
SECTION 3. A person may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property 
without due process of law, or be denied the equal protection of the 
laws. 
SECTION 4. Equal protection of the laws may not be denied or 
impaired on account of sex, race, ancestry, national origin, language or 
social status. 
SECTION 5. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and other possessions against unreasonable search, 
seizure, or invasion of privacy may not be violated. A warrant may not 
issue except on probable cause, supported by affidavit particularly 
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be 
seized. 
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SECTION 6. The defendant in a criminal case has a right to a speedy 
public trial, to be informed of the nature of the accusation, to have 
counsel for his defense, to be confronted with the witnesses against 
him, and to compel attendance of witnesses in his behalf. 
SECTION 7. A person may not be compelled to give evidence that may 
be used against him in a criminal case, or be twice put in jeopardy for 
the same offense. 
SECTION 8. Excessive bail may not be required, excessive fines 
imposed, or cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. The writ of habeas 
corpus may not be suspended unless required for public safety in cases 
of rebellion or invasion. 
SECTION 9. Capital punishment is prohibited. 
SECTION 10. Slavery and involuntary servitude are prohibited except 
to punish crime. 
SECTION 11. A bill of attainder or ex post facto law may not be 
passed. 
SECTION 12. A citizen of the (FSM) may travel and migrate within the 
Federated States. 
SECTION 13. Imprisonment for debt is prohibited. 
It is worth noting, moreover, that the Constitutions of each of the separate 
States of the FSM-Truk, Yap, Ponape, and Kosrae-contain either a Bill of Rights 
(Truk and Yap, eighteen sections), statement of "Civil Rights" (Ponape, twelve 
sections), or "Declaration of Rights" (Kosrae, seventeen sections) intended further 
to protect and enhance the individual rights and llberties of their inhabitants. The 
Constitution of the Northern Marianas (described in its preamble as "the 
embodiment of our traditions and hopes") contains as its first Article a ten-section 
statement of "Personal Rights." These include some of the virtually universal 
protections-freedom of religion, speech, press and assembly; protection against ex 
post facto laws and bills of attainder; protection against unreasonable search and 
seizure (including restrictions on "wiretapping" and "electronic eavesdropping"); 
protections in criminal prosecutions; guarantees of due process of law, trial by jury, 
and equal protection of the laws; protection against compulsory "quartering" of 
soldiers-as well as a few less common statements. 
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The right of privacy, for example, is described thusly. "The right of 
individual privacy shall not be infringed except upon a showing of compelling 
interest." This statement both enunciates a goal and balances it against 
circumstances likely to lead to its abandonment in any event. Another goal 
established as a "right" is not, however, similarly modified. "Each person has the 
right to a clean and healthful public environment." This, of course, is an objective 
to which tiny Pacific islands are likely to be especially sensitive. 
Micronesian Constitutions are interesting too in their insistence on the 
preservation of "traditional rights," even as they adopt American-inspired constitu-
tional orientations and procedural patterns in law and politics. Thus the Northern 
Marianas' statement of "Personal Rights" includes a protection against laws 
"prohibiting the traditional art of healing." The FSM Constitution includes a 
separate Article, directly following the "Declaration of Rights," entitled "Tradi-
tional Rights." It is brief, intended to reassure (and hence politically motivated), 
and innovative. 
SECTION 1. Nothing in this Constitution takes away a role OF function 
of a traditional leader as recognized by custom and tradition, or 
prevents a traditional leader from being recognized, honored, and given 
formal or functional roles at any level of government as may be 
prescribed by this Constitution or by statute. 
SECTION 2. The traditions of the people of the (FSM) may be protected 
by statute. If· challenged as violative of Article IV, protection of 
Micronesian tradition shall be considered a compelling social purpose 
warranting such governmental action. 
SECTION 3. The Congress may establish, when needed, a Chamber of 
Chiefs consisting of traditional leaders from each state having such 
leaders, and of elected representatives from states having no traditional 
leaders may provide for an active, functional role for them. 
One of the interesting features of this Article lies in Section 2, in which it is 
explicitly stated that "traditions," protected by public Act, will be permitted to 
override individual rights (described in Article IV, the "Declaration of Rights" 
referred to earlier). In turn, Section 3 permits a separate legislative chamber to be 
established to represent traditional leaders, so as further to ensure that 
Micronesian customs and traditions· may be guarded against Westernization. While 
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the Ponape State Constitution includes a separate Article containing the Sections I 
and 2 given above, the other Micronesian States declare simply that "Due 
recognition shall be given to traditions and customs in providing a system of law, 
and nothing in this Article Bill of Rights shall be construed to limit or invalidate 
any recognized tradition or custom, except as otherwise provided by law." 
This review of Bills of Rights in Pacific Constitutions suggests that while 
there is great diversity of language, and a tendency to adapt these statements to 
the circumstances of each political entity, there is nevertheless at the same time a 
certain universality of approach as well. Certain values are emphasized in each 
Constitution. These values are deemed to be so important that despite the other 
differences which distinguish Fiji from Ponape, Palau from the Cook Islands, Tuvalu 
from Yap, in each of these entities (and others too) these values have been singled 
out for special mention and protection. Whether these values will be protected in 
practice in each entity, in all the circumstances which may arise in the future, may 
be questioned. But the importance of the values themselves is apparant in their 
elaboration in these Constitutions, coming as they do before any mention of 
Government powers or legislative procdures. Editorially, the people come first in 
Pacific Constitutions. 
It may be expected that elaboration of individual rights will not only have an 
effect on Government practice, but may contribute as well to the poE tical 
education of the citizenry. Establishing in the fundamental law of the polity the 
rights and freedoms of the people as well as, in some instances, the goals of the 
nation and the responsibilities or obligations of its people, may serve to educate 
leaders and followers alike in the norms and customs associated with a democratic 
polity. 
In essence, a Bil1 of Rights contains protections against arbitrary treatment 
of the people by the State. Such a document seeks to make more permanent rights 
and freedoms which may be in danger of abridgement, or which may be described as 
fundamental to a polity seeking to conform to democratic standards. The choice of 
values to be enshrined, and the language chosen, will vary according to time, 
circumstances, and the particular anxieties and experiences of the people 
concerned. 
Whatever differences people may have about the actual language used or the 
particular protections given, Bills of Rights address themselves to a specified range 
of areas summarized above. These are quite simply the kinds of challenges to 
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which Bills of Rights are responsive. In effect, they seek to identify the main, 
irreducible components associated with the concept of "justice" in the modern 
world. This is, however, an expansive term. 
In Bills of Rights, "justice" is defined not for a philosophical purpose but for 
the more practical objective of providing individuals with legally enforceable 
protections against its infringement by the State. Thus Bills of Rights seek to 
promote values which are both vital and realizable. Bills of Rights do not address 
themselves to the breadth of the human condition, in which injustice may be found 
in myriad forms. Loneliness may be unjust, but Bills of Rights do no"t normally 
include guarantees for the right of companionship and sociability. Injustice takes 
many forms, but not all forms of injustice may be constructively confronted in a 
Bill of Rights. 
Dorothy's plaintive plea in The Wizard of Oz centers on an injustice with 
which all humans may identify. She sings: "If happy little bluebirds fly beyond the 
rainbow, why, oh why, can't I?" Of course it is unfair that birds can fly and humans 
cannot, but a Bill of Rights is not likely to provide the people with feathers and 
wings. What a Bill of Rights ~ do is to inform people of their rights, enlarge 
opportunities for political participation, and identify areas of consepsus about 
fundamental political and legal values. 
THE STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT 
Format 
Less emotionally evocative components of Constitutions follow the articula-
tion of national goals and the identification of individual rights. These subsequent 
Articles may be no less important, however, for they describe in great detail the 
structures of government, their powers and responsibilities, as well as the 
procedures to be used in selecting the nation's legislators and political leaders. For 
the most part, these documents record with considerable care the' already accepted 
practices followed in government administration and electoral law. Thus the· 
remainder of the Constitution, despite controversy surrounding particular portions 
during its development, principally embodies a public consensus about electoral 
procedures and the character of the State. There may be value, of course, in 
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recording in a single document the conventions and customs associated with 
democratic government, not merely to furher ensure their continuity, but to 
identify their main features for the benefit of leaders and citizens alike. In 
addition, including the basic democratic procedures of government in a written 
Constitution provides people with opportunities to question practices which may 
seem inappropriate, and to challenge departures from what would otherwise be 
unwritten, and hence unenforceable, conventions. 
The basic layout of Pacific Constitutional documents varies only slightly from 
one country to the next. Following the preamble, and chapters establishing the 
supremacy of the Constitution and the "Fundamental Rights and Freedoms of the 
Individual," for example, the Tuvalu Constitution includes a chapter defining 
"Citizenship" in this new nation. This is followed in turn by chapters on: the 
Governor-General; the Executive; Parliament; the Judiciary; the Public Service; 
Finance; and a catch-all "Miscellaneous" chapter providing definitions (for "the 
. Crown," "the Commonwealth," and other terms used in the Constitution) and 
various clauses elaborating on powers, functions and procedures described in the 
earlier chapters. The Kiribati Constitution omits the discussion of the Governor-
General but includes a separate section (following the chapter on finance) dealing 
with "Banaba and the Banabans." This latter chapter may be compared to chapters 
in other constitutions in polities in which the unity of the nation itself is subject to 
challenge from a group holding different loyalties. 
The Fiji Constitution conforms to the Tuvalu example given above with two 
interesting exceptions. Between chapters on "Service Commissions and the Public 
Service," and "Finance," may be found a constitutionally entrenched set of 
provisions describing "The Ombudsman." Secondly, as in many Constitutions, the 
legislature-"Parliament"-is described before the executive. There is intended to 
be a hierarchical significance in the arrangement of constitutional chapters. Power 
flows from the people-their rights are not to be infringed. The Head of State 
represents the people, as the tangible embodiment of the nation and its traditions. 
The legislature includes the people's representatives-their right to deny financial 
supply to Governments, or to oust them altogether, is fundamental. Thus the 
arrangement of constitutional chapters may not be haphazard, but may represent a 
perspective on the relationship between a people and various political institutions 
within the fabric of the State. 
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The Constitution of Western Samoa includes the chapters noted above (with 
"The Executive" preceding "Parliament"), and adds two other sections on "Land and 
Titles" and "Emergency Powers" as well as a section found in many Constitutions, 
providing "Transitional" arrangements bridging the pre-Constitution and post-
Constitution periods (declaring continuity of laws, obligations, legal proceedings 
and office holders). 
Statements of "Emergency Powers" and "Transitional Provisions" are included 
in the Nauru Constitution as well. The Cook Islands Constitution followed this 
structure when adopted in 1964: Part I on "The Government of the Cook Islands" 
(describing, in turn, "The Head of State," "The High Commissioner of the Cook 
Islands," and "The House of Arikis of the Cook Islands"); Part II, "The Executive 
Government of the Cook Islands: (describing "Cabinet," "The Executive Council" 
and "The Seal of the Cook Islands"); Part III, "The Legislative Government of the 
Cook Islands," relating to "The LeOgislative Assembly" (to be renamed "Parliament" 
in the 1981 proposed amendment); Part IV, "The Judiciary," describing "The High 
Court," "The Land Court," "The Land Appellate Court," "Justice of the Peace," and 
"The Judicial Service Commission" as well as provisions for the appointment (and 
salaries) of judges and commissioners, appeals from the High Court, and the 
appropriate oaths to be taken by judges and commissioners. These chapters were 
followed by ones on "The Public Revenues of the Cook Islands," "The Cook Islands 
Public Service" and "Transitional Provisions." Not surprisingly, the Niue Constitu-
tion conforms to this pattern with one interesting point of distinction: a chapter on 
"H~alth, Education, and Other Social Services" (sandwiched between "The Public 
Revenues of Niue" and "The Niue Public Service") detailed Cabinet's obligation to 
maintain hospitals, schools and "other institutions and services •.. necessary to 
provide a reasonable standard of living for the people of Niue and to secure their 
economic, social, and cultural welfare." 
The space allocated in Pacific Constitutions to describing the structure of 
Government is impressive. The Tuvalu Constitution is one example. Its preamble 
is half a page. The Chapter on "The State and The Constitution" is two sentences 
in length. The Bill of Rights occupies 14 pages. Provisions on citizenship account 
for another three. A section on "The Governor-General" takes up most of a page. 
The Executive (Prime Minister and Cabinet) is descibed in five pages. Parliament 
is discussed in a further seven pages. Four pages are reserved for the Judiciary, 
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three and a half for the Public Service, three more for Finance, while the 
remaining four and a half pages of this fifty-four page document tidy up a range of 
miscellaneous items. 
These proportions are found in other Constitutions too. The Nauru 
Constitution contains an eight-page Bill of Rights, two pages for the "President and 
Executive," five for the Legislature, two for the "Judicature," and two and a half 
each for Finance and the Public Service. 
Approaches to Democratic Government 
Political scientists have identified several basic dichotomies useful in 
describing structural arrangements in democratic political systems. Olle dimension 
relates to the distribution of power between a central authority, on the one hand, 
and other territorial authorities. Is the local and regional government (if any) 
subordinate to the legislative power of the central government? Or are they more 
nearly co-equal in responsibilities and prerogatives? May local governments have 
their powers and boundaries modified, or their existence discontinued altogether, 
through action by the central government? Or do sub-national political authorities 
have a more durable life of their own, insulated to some degree from the whims or 
aspirations of national elites? 
Another dimension relates to the legislative power. Is the law-making 
function divided between two houses of the legislature? Or is the legislative power 
embodied in a one-house chamber? Do sub-national territorial authorities enjoy 
special protections based upon the method of legislative representation? Or is the 
na tion viewed as a single constituency, with the population principle--one person, 
one vote-employed exclusively in the apportionment of electorates? 
A third major dimension revolves about the power of the executive. Is the 
executive chosen independently of the legislature? Is the executive given a fixed 
and definite term of office? Does the chief executive hold an elected seat with the 
legislative chamber? Or is the executive chosen amongst the members of the 
legislature? Does the executive retain power only so long as the government 
retains majority support within the legislature? May elections be held at irregular 
intervals, corresponding tofJuctuations in support for different factions within the 
legislative assembly? 
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Pacific polities may be distinguished from one another by the way in which 
their political systems respond to these and related inquiries. The following table 
seeks to paint a broad picture of the political structures to be found in the various 
Pacific polities. 
It is evident that, reflecting their colonial experience and the. preferences of 
new governing elites, the Pacific polities are characterized by some considerable 
diversity. Nevertheless certain broad patterns are exhibited and, in broad terms, 
there is an apparent preference for unitary political systems, utilizing a unicameral 
legislature, a symbolic Head of State (often reflecting Commonwealth member-
ship), and a parliamentary system in which the executive-known generally as the 
Cabinet, headed by a Prime Minister-is formed from amongst the political 
majority in the legislature. The American approach, utilizing "separation of 
powers" and described as "presidential" in the table, is significantly less popular. 
Of course in practice traditional authorities may play important roles and, in any 
event "mixed" models modify the British parliamentary form in situations in which, 
for instance, a High Commissioner may intervene successfully to overturn· local 
legislative and executive preferences. The structural traits distinguishing Pacific 
polities from one another'will now be examined in greater detail. 
Federal systems are found in Palau (or Belau) and the FSM. Thus the latter 
Constitution includes an article on "Levels of Government" and another on "Powers 
of Government," seeking to allocate powers and responsibilities amongst national, 
state and local governments. Provisions of this nature may be found in Pacific 
Constitutions for non-federal entities as well, when internal politics suggest a need 
to maintain important local political structures while circumscribing national 
powers. The Solomon Islands-a multi-island entity whose national unity may be 
somewhat fragile--includes in its Constitution a chapter' on "Provincial Govern-
ment" (two sentences long) intending to divide the Solomons into provinces, with 
boundaries, government structures and roles for traditional chiefs to be determined 
by Parliament. 
Federal polities normally function with bicameral national legislatures, in 
which one chamber's representatives are allocated nation-wide according to 
population, while the other chamber's representatives represent the federation's 
constituent units-states or provinces-equally~ In such unions, bicameral 
legislatures so constituted embody the federal bargain, or compromise, designed to 
preserve the autonomy of lightly populated members agianst possible domination by 
larger entities. Within the Pacific, however, this federal pattern, is followed, 
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TABLE I: TYPES OF POLITICAL SYSTEMS IN PACIFIC POLITIES 
Political Type of Type of Distribution Head of Head of 
Country Status Executive Legislature of Power State Government 
American Unorganized, Presidential Bicameral Unitary President Governor -
Samoa Unincorporated, of the ultimate responsibility 
U.S. territory U.S.A. with the President, 
acting through the 
Secretary of the Interior 
Cook self-governing, Parliamentary Unicameral Unitary Queen Prime Minister 
Islands in free Elizabeth II 
association 
with New Zealand 
Fiji Independent Parliamentary Bicameral Unitary Queen Prime Minister 
t.J Elizabeth II 
~ 
French overseas Parliamentary Unicameral Unitary President High Commi~sioner 
Polynesia territory of the 
of France Kepublic of 
France 
Guam Unincorporated, Presidential Unicameral Unitary President same as American 
organized, U.S. of the Samoa 
territory U.S.A. 
Kiribati independent mixture of Unicameral Unitary The Beretitenti of 
Presidential Kiribati 
& Parliamentary 
models 
Nauru independent Parliamentary Unicameral Unitary The President of Nauru 
New overseas Parliamentary Unicameral Unitary same as French Polynesia 
Caledonia territory 
of France 
T ABLE I (continued) 
Political Type of Type of Distribution H~ad of Head of 
Country Status Executive Legislature of Power State Government 
Niue self-governing, Parliamentary Unicameral Unitary Queen Premier 
in free Elizabeth II 
association with 
New Zealand 
Papua Independent Parliamentary Unicameral Unitary Queen Prime Minister 
New Guinea Elizabeth II 
The Solomon Independent Par liamen tary Unicameral Unitary Queen Prime Minister 
Islands Elizabeth II 
Tokelau not fully mixture of Unicameral Unitary Queen Secretary of 
self -governing; parliamentary Elizabeth II Foreign Affairs, 
dependency of and pre- New Zealand 
New Zealand parliamentary Government 
~ models 
<Xl 
Tonga independent consti tutional Unicameral Unitary The King of Tonga 
monarchy/ 
parliamentary 
Tuvalu independent Par liamentary Unicameral Unitary Queen Prime Minister 
Elizabeth II 
T. T.P.I. (as anticipated) 
Common- Commonwealth presidential Bicameral Unitary Governor/ Governor 
wealth of the in Political President 
Northern Union with of the U.S.A. 
Marianas the U.S.A. 
F.S.M. self-governing, mixture of Unicameral Federal President of the F .S.M 
in free as so- presidential 
ciation with & parliamentary 
the U.S.A. models 
The Marshall same as Par liamen tary Unicameral Unitary President of the Marshall Islands 
Islands above 
t>,) 
co 
TABLE I (continued) 
Country 
Political 
. Status 
Belau (Palau) same as 
above 
Vanuatu independent 
Western independent 
Type of Type of 
Executive Legislature 
Presidential Bicameral 
Parliamentary Unicameral 
Parliamentary Unicameral 
Distribution 
of Power 
Federal 
Unitary 
Unitary 
Head of 
State 
Head of 
Government 
President of Belau (Palau) 
President of Prime Minister 
Vanuatu of Vanuatu 
Malietoa Prime Minister 
T anumafili II 
(surviving royal 
title holder, con-
stitutionally 
specified) 
surprisingly, only in the relatively compact and lightly populated entity of Palau. 
The much more diffuse FSM is virtually unique among federations in maintaining a 
one-house national legislature, containing members allocated using both the 
population and state equality principles of representation. Other Pacific polities 
which are not federations, however, have established bicameral national legisla-
tures. As in most federations, each chamber represents a distinct response to the 
basic challenge of democratic government: who shall rule? 
Thus in American Samoa, a unitary political system with the status of a 
United States territory not fully incorporated into the American system, the House 
of Representatives represents the people as a whole, and are chosen by them in 
popular elections. The Senate, however, represents the matai, or chiefs. Only 
matai may serve in the Senate, and only matai may select Senators, who are chosen 
"according to Samoan custom" (through discussion at a meeting of all matai within 
a legislative district, with the choice arrived at by "consensus"). Each legislative 
chamber reflects a separate kind of answer to the problem of selecting the political 
leadership for this society. 
In Western Samoa, by contrast, only one principle is used for selecting 
representatives in the Fono, or Parliament. Only matai may stand for qffice, and 
only matai may vote. Only persons not part of the Samoan cultural and familial 
network, known as "individual voters," have the right-apart from matai-to 
participate in national elections. These "individual voters"-who embody the 
principle of universal suffrage-are entitled to two (of 47) representatives in the 
Fono. It might have been equally plausible, though not necessarily more practical 
or efficient, to have expected to find these two separate principles for political 
choice-making to be represented by separate legislative chambers (as in American 
Samoa) rather than alongside one another in the same legislature. 
Fiji's Constitution too employs two approaches to legislative composition. 
The allocation of members in the Fiji House of Representatives, a delicate political 
subject, is according to ethnic group: Fijian; Indian; European (or 'other'). The 
Senate, in turn, is selected by political groups-the Government and the 
Opposition-augmented by traditional chiefly authority. In practice, as the 
political groups reflect the ethnic divisions paramount in Fijian politics, the two 
legislative chambers are complementary. Constitutionally, however, each chamber 
has a different rationale, a distinct approach to organizing the polity for decision-
making purposes. 
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The Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, although non-federal, 
also utilizes a bicameral legislature. The rationale for it is important. The House 
embodies the familiar democratic formula designed to maintain the equal value of 
every vote: representatives are allocated to legislative districts comparable in 
population size. The Senate, however, reflects the multi-island nature of this 
enti ty, and the disproportionate size of one of the islands (Saipan) in relation to the 
others. Thus the very existence of the Senate is designed to reassure more lightly 
populated islands that they will not be submerged within the overall entity, by 
providing an institutional mechanism for them to seek to promote and defend their 
interests. The Senate, therefore, is not chosen strictly according to population, but 
in a way designed to provide islands with representatives to which they would not 
be "entitled" were population criteria to be strictly followed. 
The Marianas' approach to legislative representation is shared by other 
Pacific polities comprised of a number of scattered islands. All of the Pacific 
countries not already noted above maintain unicameral legislatures. Some of 
them-the Cook Islands, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands-guarantee representation 
to islands without seeking to determine, or periodically measure, whether islands 
with equal numbers of representatives contain comparable numbers of people. In 
many instances significant discrepancies would be found, but the legislative 
arrangements provided in the Constitution are part of the terms by which national 
unity and political stability are promoted. This is so on Niue too, for in this one-
island polity's legislative assembly, each of Niue's fourteen villages-irrespective 
of its population {and there are major differences among them)-is entitled to one 
representative, augmented in turn by six representatives chosen by the voters of 
the entire island organized as a single constituency. In this way, once more two 
representational principles are at work: one protecting each local unit, the other 
favoring larger numbers of people identified as "the national interest." 
Federalism and bicameralism are two features which distinguish the constitu-
tions of Pacific polities from one another. As noted, elsewhere in the world these 
structural characteristics often go hand in hand. However, in the Pacific, one of 
the two federal polities is unicameral while some of the multi-island polities, while 
unitary in their political character, seek to protect the interests of inhabitants of 
less heavily populated islands either through bicameralism or through modifications 
to the population pronciple in allocating representation. Table II seeks to 
summarize some important features of Pacific island legislatures. 
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TABLE II: LEGISLATIVE SYSTEMS IN PACIFIC POLITIES 
Type of Basis of Frequency of Role of Legislators* 
Country LegislaJure Representation Elections to Population 
American Bicameral- Senate - representation Senate - 4 years 1: 1666 (Senate) 
Samoa The Fono = of matai; House - 2 years 1: 1500 (House) 
The Senate House - popular 1: 789 (Fono) 
+ House representa tion 
Cook Islands unicameral- popular representation 5 years 1: 818 
Parliament + guarantees for island 
representa tion 
Fiji bicameral House - representation 5 years 1:26,727 (Senate) 
. Parliament = of ethnic groups; . 1: 11 , 308 (House) 
House of Senate - representation 1: 7,946 (Parliament) 
UJ Representatives of political groups 
I:\:) 
+ Senate and traditional authority 
French unicameral - popular representation 5 years 1: 4667 
Polynesia Territorial + guarantees for island 
Assembly representation 
Guam unicameral - popular representation 2 years 1: 5476 
Senate 
Kiribati unicameral - popular representation 4 years 1: 1571 
The Maneaba ni + some guarantees for 
Maungatabu island representation 
Nauru unicameral - 8 constituencies, 4 years 1: 403 
Parliament territorially based 
New unicameral - popular representation 5 years 1: 3878 
Caledonia Territorial 
Assembly 
Niue unicameral - equal representation 3 years 1: 200 
The Niue for each village 
Assembly 
TABLE II (continued) 
Type of Basis of Frequency of Role of Legislators* 
Country Legislature Representation Elections to Population 
Papua unicameral - popular representation 5 years 1:27,438 
New Guinea The National in "open electorates" 
Parliament and "provincial electorates" 
The Solomon unicameral - popular representation 4 years 1: 4120 
Islands The National 
Parliament 
Tokelau unicameral - equal representation 3 years 1: 266 
The Fono for each island group 
Tonga unicameral - equal representation 3 years 1: 5 (nobles) 
The Legislative for Nobles and the 1: 12 , 857 (people) 
Assembly People (7 each), + 1: 6,429 (nobles and people; 
representation for (Le., all elected 
Privy Councillors and representatives) 
CAl Cabinet Ministers 1:4,286 (The Legislative 
CAl Assembly) 
Tuvalu unicameral - popular representation 4 years 1: 750 
Parliament + guarantees for island 
representation 
T.T.P.I. -
Commonwealth bicameral - State - representation Senate 1: 2039 (Senate) 
of the Northern N.M. of islands (in districts) 4 years for 1: 1311 (House) 
Marianas Commonwealth House - representation by first two In 1: 798 (Commonwealth) 
Legislature = population each district Legislature 
The Senate + 2 years for third; 
The House House - 2 years 
F.S.M. unicameral - equal representation (1) Members elected 1: 6429 
The Congress for each state (4), by state equality, (numbers of legislators 
of the F .S.M. + representation by 4 years; other in state legislatures 
population Members, 2 years not included) 
:.ol 
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TABLE II (continued) 
Country 
The Marshall 
Islands 
Belau (Palau) 
Vanuatu 
Western 
Samoa 
Type of 
Legislature 
unicameral -
The Nitijela 
Bicameral -
Olbiil Era 
Kelulau = 
House of 
Delegates 
+ Senate 
unicameral -
Parliament 
unicameral -
Fono 
Basis of 
Representa tion 
popular representation 
+ guarantees for island 
representation 
Senate - equal 
representation (1) for 
each state (16); 
House - representation 
by population 
popular representation 
Frequ~ncy of 
Elections· . 
4 years 
4 years 
4 years 
representation of 3 years 
matai (45 members) 
+ representation for 
persons on the individual 
voters' roll (2 members) 
Role of Legislators* 
to Population 
1: 909 
1: 938 (Senate) 
1: 833 (House) 
1: 441 (01biil Era 
Kelulau) 
(numbers of legislators 
in state legislatures 
not included) 
1: 2887 
1: 3234 
*NOTE: Comparable figures would reveal significant variations in ratios of numbers of legislators to numbers of eligible 
and enrolled voters, respectively. 
As In the earlier table comparing broader components of Pacific political 
systems, so too in this table there are broad patterns but, perhaps suprisingly,. 
significant diversity as well. The population principle for determining legislative 
representation, identified by the United States Supreme Court as (in effect). the 
sole basis compatible with democratic principles (excluding the special circum-
stances relating to the composition of the United States Congress), is significantly 
modified to permit the attainment of other objectives. These include unity (as in 
the American example), so that lesser populated islands are given representation to 
which their population numbers might not otherwise "entitle" them, as well as the 
preservation of traditional values and expectations (as in the representation of 
matai). In other ways, such as the size of Pacific Legislature and their relationship 
to population numbers, the frequency of elections, and other subjects not 
summarized in the table (choice of Speaker, development of committee structures, 
the use of indigenous languages and so on), the legislative systems of Pacific 
polities are characterized more by diversity than by uniformity of approach. It is 
doubtful, moreover, that considerations of principle dictated the greater variation 
in ratios of legislative size to population, for example. Is there an appropriate 
ratio for a given society? Is there an optimum size for legislatures, a balance 
which best achieves democratic representation and maximum efficiency? Is there 
an especially desirable period which ought to elapse, between elections, to permit 
governments to govern? How frequent ought elections to be held? On these and 
other questions, political science has no fixed answers. It should not be too 
surprising that Pacific constitution-makers have chosen to experiment with a 
variety of responses to these and other questions. 
If there is an absence of accepted criteria to assess (in the abstract) choices 
made in organizing legislative systems, nevertheless there is some preference for 
retaining as low a ratio as possible between the elected representative and the 
people. If "direct democracy" is not possible, then at least small constituencies 
permit a close relationship with the legislator and hence may be thought of as 
"more democratic." This is not always possible and in large polities it becomes 
quite impossible indeed. For example, the ratio of legislators (only in the Congress, 
excluding therefore the state legislatures) to population is 1 :450,000. The ratio in 
the state of Hawaii is broadly comparable to that of Fiji: 1:35,480 (Senate); 
1: 17,392 (House); 1: 11 ,671 (State Legislature). Nevertheless democratic theorists 
might look approvingly at the ratios found in Niue, Nauru, the Cook Islands, 
Tokelau, Tuvalu, the Northern Marianas, the Marshall Islands, and elsewhere too for 
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in such circumstances it may become more difficult for the State to come to be 
regarded as alien and unapproachable. In Belau, when the state legislatures are 
taken into account as well, it may be argued that the ratio has been reduced to as 
slim a proportion as may be possible, so that the boundary between "direct" and 
"representative" democracy becomes exceedingly indistinct. 
Another way in which Pacific entities may be distinguished from one another 
is in their organization of the executive functions of government. Tokelau relies in 
essence upon traditional leadership, augmented by the Tokelau Public Service 
supported by New Zealand assistance. It is moving gradually towards a 
parliamentary model of government, however, utilizing a unicameral body for 
discussion and law-making known as the Fono. Although vastly different in so many 
respects, Tonga too is a mixed polity, utilizing parliamentary forms ar.d structures 
immersed in a traditional setting in which the substance of power remains with the 
King and the nobles. Although tradition plays a role in any poitical system, the 
Pacific polities fall neatly· for the most part into the two democratic models of 
government: parliamentary (or British-influenced), and presidential (the American 
approach). 
In the presidential model, the executive is selected separately from the 
legislature. The Head of the Government is not a member of the legislature, but 
holds a fixed term of office, may not be defeated within a party caucus or on a 
vote of no-confidence in the legislature, and is responsible not to the legislature 
but to his own constituency. The people of American Samoa elect a Governor and 
Lieutenant-Governor, for example. They are physically and politically separate 
from the two houses of the Samoan legislature (or Fono). Power is therefore 
divided between the executive and the legislature: the two are not joined together 
inextricably as in parliamentary, or Cabinet, systems of government. 
The Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas, Guam (an American territory 
governed under an "Organic Act" equivalent to a Constitution), and Palau reflect 
their American-inspired political development in adhering to a presidential model. 
Their chief executives are elected by the people for fixed terms of office. Other 
Pacific polities follow the American example; in a few cases, only in nomenclaure. 
The Head of State may be designated a "President" (as on Nauru, or in the Marshall 
Islands) but in fact the person holding this office is not elected for a fixed term by 
the people nor is he separate from the legislative structure of government. 
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In Kiribati, the President-known as "Beretitenti"--is both Head of State and 
Head of Government. In other words, he combines the functions carried out 
elsewhere by the Prime Minister and the Governor-General. The Constitution of 
Kiribati provides that "A person who assumes the office of Beretitenti ... shall no~, 
by reason of the fact that he holds the office, cease to be a member of the 
Maneaba [i.e., the Legislature]." In the United Kingdom the idea of the Governor-
General serving as an active member of Parliament would be novel indeed! 
Similarly, the basis for the American presidential model is separation of powers, so 
that constitutions which place the President within the legislature depart 
fundamentally from the American model. In certain important structural ways, 
therefore, some of the Pacific polities are challenging examples of innovation in 
democratic polities, establishing models of government structurally unfamiliar to 
political scientists acquainted exclusively with European and North American 
poli tical structures. 
The Head of State 
The first topic relating to political structure addressed by Pacific Constitu-
tions is the identity of the Head of State. In the Cook Islands, this reads: 
Her Majesty the Queen in right of New Zealand shall be the Head of 
State of the Cook Islands. 
The political status of the Cook Islands, in relation to New Zealand, has 
involved representation of the Head of State by a High Commissioner who has also 
been the representative of the Government of New Zealand in the Cook Islands. A 
slightly different situation has existed in Niue. Its Constitution opens by declaring: 
The executive authority of Niue is vested in Her Majesty the Queen in 
right of New Zealand is accordingly the representative of Her Majesty 
the Queen in relation to Niue. 
The Cook Islands and Niue are part of the New Zealand "realm" of Queen 
Elizabeth II. Tuvalu, as a fully independent polity, constitutes a realm of the 
Crown in its own right. Having affirmed Tuvalu's allegiance to Queen Ellzabeth II, 
Her Heirs and Successors, in its preamble, the Tuvalu Constitution opens its first 
structural chapter forthrightly. 
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There shall be a Governor-General of Tuvalu who shall be Her Majesty's 
Representative in Tuvalu. 
Fiji uses similar language to describe its Governor-General who is also 
designated "Commander-in-Chief," while PNG describes "The Head of State" in a 
more elaborate way: 
(1) Her Majesty the Queen 
(a) having been requested by the people of Papua New Guinea, through 
their Constituent Assembly, to become the Queen and Head of 
State of Papua New Guinea; and 
(b) having graciously consented so to become, is the Queen and Head of 
State of Papua New Guinea. 
This wording establishes a constitutional relationship between the Queen and 
the people, in which it is declared, in effect, that she serves as Head of State at 
their pleasure. It is at their request, and according to their Constitution, that she 
is designated (further in this part of the PNG Constitution) "Elizabeth II, Queen of 
Papua New Guinea and Her other Realms and Territories, Head of the Common-
wealth." Elsewhere the Head of State is given precedence "in rank ove,r all other 
persons in (PNG)", and constitutional provisions referring to the Queen are 
extended to Her heirs and successors. The PNG Constitution describes the 
Governor-General within this section on "The Head of State" thusly: 
Subject to and in accordance with this Constitution, the privileges, 
powers, functions, duties and responsibilities of the Head of State may 
be had, exercised and performed through a Governor-General ... 
The provisions of the Western Samoa Constitution are almost certainly unique in 
their description of "The Head of State" in several respects. 
First, because of the existence of four royal titles in Samoan custom, the 
Constitution established the position of Head of State but declared that upon 
Independence the position would be held jointly by two persons who were 
specifically named (royal title-holders). Secondly, provisions in the Western Samoa 
Constitution provide explicitly for a change in political status to occur without 
constitutional amendment. That is, the Constitution itself has built in procedures 
for selecting a new Head of State, by a new method, when the present Head of 
State-both persons-ceases to occupy the office. 
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This is done quite efficiently. On the death of one of the named persons, the 
survivor continues to hold the office of Head of State. More dramatically: 
On the death, resignation or removal from office of both the persons named 
in Clause (l) or of the survivor of either of them, this Article shall cease to 
be in force. 
A t that point, other provisions of the Constitution come into force, providing 
for selection of a new Head of State by the Legislative Assembly. In this manner, 
the writers of the Western Samoa Constitution have sought to develop procedures 
to alter the means by which their head of State is selected, with minimal disruption 
or disturbance. These allow the present holders of appropriate titles to hold this 
high office, so that the loyalties of people to them are not disturbed or provoked by 
procedures which envisage a different approach subsequently to the problem of 
selecting a Head of State. (How these procedures will work in the future, and to 
what effect, remains to be seen, of course.) 
Constitutions of Pacific entities linked to the British Crown in one way or 
another describe the position of the representative of the Head of State (Queen 
Elizabeth II) , known in most instances as "The Governor-General." The Tuvalu 
Constitution, for example, specifies that 
No person shaH be appointed to the office of Governor-General unless he is a 
citizen of Tuvalu. 
A comparable intent is reflected in the Solomon Islands' constitutional 
requirement that 
A person shall not be qualified for appointment to the office of Governor-
General unless he is qualified for election as a member of Parliament .•. 
The PNG Constitution contains the most elaborate provisions dealing with a 
Governor-General found in any Pacific Constitution. These provisions describe the 
functions, duties and responsibilities of the Head of State (and the Governor-
Genera!), qualifications for appointment of a Governor-General, procedures to be 
fol1owed in appointing a Governor-General, procedures for dismissal, removal and 
suspension from office, procedures for resignation of the office, procedures for 
declaration of loyalty, term of office, and terms and conditions of emp{oyment. 
The space devoted to describing the position is, in a way, a measure of the gravity 
with which the office is viewed. It is often said that the position of Governor-
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General is largely symbolic. Real power accrues to the post as well, as examples in 
Fiji and Australia during the mid-1970s revealed. However, even as symbolic 
offices, Governors-General may be expected to be important in new states, in 
which political symbols may be viewed seriously rather than cynically. The 
Governor-General, after all, symbolizes a new political entity. Who he is, and what 
he may properly do, are matters not to be taken lightly in such circumstances. 
In PNG, as in Tuvalu and the Solomons, the Governor-General "must be a 
citizen ... qualified to be a member of the Parliament." In addition, however, he 
must be "a mature person of good standing who enjoys the general respect of the 
community." Politically wise constitutionalists took the trouble further to note 
that the question of whether a proposed appointee is, or is not, "a mature person" 
(etc.) "is non-justiciable" (i.e., may not be raised in a court so as to block the 
appointment.) 
The terms of office of Governors-General in Pacific polities vary to some 
degree. In the Solomons, a five-year term is specified. In PNG, the term of office 
is six years. Elsewhere, the Governor-General serves "during Her Majesty's 
pleasure" (Fiji) or "by her Majesty acting in accordance with the advice of the 
Prime Minister tendered after the Prime Minister has in confidence consulted the 
members of Parliament" (Tuvalu). The Tuvalu Constitution provides, as noted, for 
a role for Parliament, in both the appointment and removal of a Governor-General. 
This is the case in the newer Pacific polities which have established such an office. 
The PNG Constitution, for example, specifies that 
••. the Governor-General shall be appointed by the Head of State, acting 
with, and in accordance with, the advice of the National Executive Council 
given in accordance with a decision of the Parliament. A decision of the 
Parliament to nominate a person for apointement as Governor-General shall 
be made by a simple majority vote, in an exhaustive secret ballot •.. 
Elsewhere the PNG Constitution provides that a Governor-General may not 
be appointed for a second term except by a "two-thirds absolute majority vote" of 
Par liament, while a third term is ruled out altogether. In the Solomons, the 
Governor-General "shall be appointed by the Head of State in accordance with an 
address from Parliament. .." The Governor-General may be removed by "an 
address from Parliament supported by the votes of at least two-thirds of all the 
members thereof, for misbehaviour or for such other cause as may be prescribed by 
Par liament." 
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Executive Power-Cabinet and the Prime Minister 
Descriptions of the Head of State lead smoothly to a delineation of the nature 
of the executive in many Pacific polities. This can be done through a transitional 
passage, as in the Solomons' Constitutions: 
The Prime Minister shall keep the Governor-General fully informed 
concerning the general conduct of the government ... and shall furnish 
the Governor-General with such information as he may request with 
respect to any particular matter .•. 
This leads quite naturally into a description of the office of Prime Minister, 
other Ministers, and Cabinet as a whole. The sequence of offices and structures 
described in the Constitution has a neat political logiC associated with it. Since in 
a parliamentary system the executive arises out of the legislature and is 
responsible to it, constitutional provisions describing the Prime Minister and 
Cabinet lead inexorably to sections describing the legislative branch (usually 
termed "Parliament" but known in the Pacific by indigenous names as well such as 
Maneaba in Maungatabul-as in Kiribati--or Olbiil Era Kelulau-as in Palau). (An 
alternative approach in Pacific Constitutions-see page 23-gives priority to the 
legislature as the political structure "closest to the people"). 
The Articles of Pacific Constitutions dealing with the Prime Minister and 
Cabinet, and the Legislature, address several related issues. How shall political 
leadership be chosen? To whom shall it be responsible? How will policy 
responsibilities be allocated? How frequently shall elections be held? What 
procedures shall be followed in selecting a Prime Minister, Cabinet Ministers, and 
Members of Parliament? How is the nation to be mapped for representational 
purposes? For the most part, developing procedures for these matters has been 
done concisely, and in a manner which well reflects established parliamentary 
practice. 
Thus the Solomons' Constitution describes the choice of a Prime Minister 
thusly: 
There shall be a Prime Minister who shall be elected as such by the 
members of Parliament from amongst their number ••. 
Could the procedures for choosing a Prime Minister be described more 
succinctly than that? In this sentence, the qualifications for the office-the Prime 
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Minister must be an MP-and the electors responsible for the choice-the other 
MPs-are each clearly stated. The Constitution goes on to describe the selection 
of the remainder of Cabinet. 
There shall be, in addition to the office of Prime Minister such other offices 
of Minister of the Government, not exceeding eleven or such greater number 
as Parliament may prescribe, as may be established by the Governor-General, 
acting in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister: Provided that 
one of such offices of Minister of the Government shall be that of Deputy 
Prime Minister. 
The Solomons' Constitution adds that "The Ministers ... shall be appointed 
among the members of Parliament," which completes the statement of Ministerial 
qualifica tions. The constitutional requirement of a Deputy Prime Minister 
institutionalizes what may only be a convention in older parliamentary polities. 
Another point of interest is the effort to limit the size of Cabinet (for reasons of 
economy), in this case to twelve including the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime 
Minister. In the much smaller polity of Tuvalu, the comparable constitutional 
provision declares that "There shall be . • • other offices of Minister· of the 
Government, not exceeding 4 ••• " while in Kiribati it is stipulated that tile Cabinet 
shall consist of "the Beretitenti, the Kauoman-ni Beretitenti (Vice-President) and 
not more than eight other ~inisters, and the Attorney-General" appointed "from 
among members of the Maneabea ni Maungatabu." 
How do governments fall in parliamentary systems? The Solomons' 
Constitution makes mandatory the traditional practice in the British political 
system. 
If a resolution of no confidence in the Prime Minister is passed by Parliament 
by an absolute majority of the votes of members thereof the Governor-
General shall remove the Prime Minister from office, whereupon the 
members of Parliament shall meet as soon as possible during the same session 
of Parliament to elect a new Prime Minister ••• A motion for a resolution of 
no confidence in the Prime Minister shall not be passed by Parliament unless 
notice of the motion has been given to the Speaker at least seven clear days 
before it is introduced. 
In Tuvalu, "the office of Prime Minister shall become vacant .•• if a motion 
of no confidence in the Government receives in Parliament the affirmative votes of 
a majority of all the members." In the Pacific constitutions describing 
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parliamentary procedure, provisions are given as well for vacancies In any 
Ministerial office (including Prime Minister) arising out of resignation, election to 
the position of Speaker or Deputy Speaker, new parliamentary elections and, in the 
case of Ministers, revocation of their appointment to Cabinet "by the Governor-
General, acting in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister." 
Cabinet is given a secure constitutional basis as well in these documents. The 
Solomons' Constitution declares: 
There shall be a Cabinet. consisting of the Prime Minister and the other 
Ministers. The functions of the Cabinet shall be to advise the Governor-
General in the government of Solomon Islands and the Cabinet shall be 
collectively responsible to Parliament for any advice given to the Governor-
General by or under the general authority of the Cabinet and for all things 
done by or under the authority of any Minister in the execution of his office. 
In this manner, the Westminster concept of Cabinet's "collective respon-
sibility" is entrenched firmly in the Constitution itself, seeking to make mandatory 
what might otherwise be regarded as a quaint and somewhat ambiguous historical 
remnant. In the Marshall Islands, whose polity includes a mix of parliamentary and 
presidential features, Cabinet is described more elaborately still. 
The executive authority of the Marshall Islands shall be vested in the Cabinet, 
whose members are collectively responsible to the Nitijela (legislature). 
Subject to law, the Cabinet may exercise elements of its executive authority 
directly, or through its individual members, and through other officers 
responsible to the Cabinet; but neither the provisions of any such law, nor any 
delegation of elements of the Cabinet's executive authority shall have the 
effect of diminishing the responsibility of the Cabinet and of each of its 
members to the Nitijela for the direction and implementation of executive 
policies. 
This language establishes the primacy of the legislature over the executive. 
Through it, Cabinet and its individual Ministers are declared ful1y responsible to the 
legislature for the setting of policy goals and their execution in day-to-day 
administration. Further on in this Constitution, Cabinet's "executive authority" is 
described to "include ... the following powers, functions, duties and responsi-
bilities": 
... the general direction and control of the government; ..• such legislative 
proposals as it considers necessary or desirable . •. ; .•. conducting the 
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foreign affairs of the Marshall Islands ... ; ... making such provision as may 
be reasonable and necessary for ... security ... ; ... power of reprieve and 
pardon; ... establishing and maintaining such hospitals and other institutions 
and for providing such other services as may be reasonable and necessary for 
the public health; ... establishing and maintaining .. ,. public school ... ; ... 
establishing and maintaining such other institutions and services ..• as may be 
reasonable and necessary to achieve an adequate stan'dard of living for the 
people ... , to enable them to enjoy their legal rights, and to serve their 
economic, social and cultural welfare ... 
These responsibilities were in addition to those relating to taxation and public 
expenditure, and relate as much to the social goals of government enumerated in 
the Marshalls' Bill of Rights as they do to the requirements of c0nstitutional 
draftsmanship. In other Pacific polities using parliamentary institutions, descrip-
tion of the composition of Cabinet is followed by a core of provisions deemed of 
fundamental importance relating to Cabinet proceedings. In Tuvalu, for example, 
the Constitution reads: 
The Cabinet shall be summoned by the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister 
shall, so far as is practicable, attend and preside at all meetings of the 
Cabinet. No business except that of adjournment shall be transacted in the 
Cabinet if objection is taken by any member present that there are less than 
3 members present. 
- In the Solomons' Constitution too, there is a provision permitting Cabinet 
business to be delayed should notice be taken "that there are present less than a 
majority of the members. "Subsequent constitutional provisions relating to 
Cabinet include: oaths to be taken by Ministers; assignment of administrative 
responsibilities to Ministers; responsibilities of other executive officers (including, 
in different constitutions, the Attorney-General, Commissioner of Police, Secre-
tary to Cabinet (or Government), Director of Public Prosecutions, Leader of the 
Opposition (in Fiji ); Procedures to be followed in granting a pardon or in other 
exercises of the "perogative of mercy." Some Pacific Constitutions describe an 
Executive Council, consisting of Cabinet and the Head of State (Western Samoa) or 
the representative of the Head of State. In Kiribati, a Council of State is described 
(consisting of the Chairman of the Public Service Commission, the Chief Justice, 
and the Speaker), and given executive functions in certain (temporary) 
circumstances. The Solomons' Constitution addresses the question of Prime 
Ministerial disability: 
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Whenever the Prime Minister is unable, by reason of illness or absence from 
Solomon Islands, to perform the functions conferred on him by this 
Constitution, those functions shall be performed by the Deputy Prime 
Minister or, if he too is unable to do so, the Governor-General may, by 
directions in writing, authorise some other Minister to perform those 
functions . and that Minister may perform those functions until his 
authority is revoked by the Governor-General. The powers of the Governor-
General under this section shall be exercised by him in accordance with the 
advice of the Prime Minister: Provided that if the Governor-General, acting 
in his own deliberate judgment, considers that it is impracticable to obtain 
the advice of the Prime Minister owing to the Prime Minister's illness or 
absence, the Covernor-General may exercise those powers without that 
advice and in his own deliberate judgment. 
While these provisions may seem fraught with mischief, they do represent an 
effort to grapple with a plausible contingency. The Constitution of the United 
States of America was amended in 1967 to cope with Presidential disability, and 
the Solomons' effort seeks to establish procedures for Prime Ministerial disability 
compatible with a parliamentary system utilizing a Governor-General. The quality 
of the Governor-General's information, as well as his degree of initiative and 
political acumen, will have some considerable bearing on the likelihood of these 
provisions ever being activated. Constitutional provisions do not create certainties 
so much as opportunities, and whether these are accepted and utilized in 
appropriate situations will always depend on the character, energy and intelligence 
of the political participants concerned. 
The Legislature 
The legislature article in Pacific Constitutions varies greatly, depending on 
whether the system is presidential or parliamentary, federal or unitary, bicameral 
or unicameral. Presidential, federal and bicameral systems are the most complex, 
and may require lengthy and detailed sets of provisions. The national legislative 
powers will be enumerated with great care, so that they may be distinguished from 
those reserved to the executive branch, or to state and provincial governments. 
Bicameral legislatures involve detailed constitutional work to describe the two 
legislative chambers, distinguish them in their powers and responsibilities, establish 
their separate electoral procedures and representational bases, and, in turn, relate 
their separate and joint relationships to the executive. 
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The Chapter dealing with the legislature proceeds In a very straightforward 
manner. Nauru's Constitution reads: 
There shall be a Parliament of Nauru. SUbject to this Constitution, 
Parliament may make laws for the peace, order and good government of 
Nauru ... 
The Solomons' Constitution opens its discussion of the legislature with the 
following simple statement: 
There shall be a national legislature for Solomon Islands, which shall consist 
of a single chamber and shall be known as the National Parliament of Solomon 
Islands. 
Niue begins its description of "The Legislative Government of Niue" similarly: 
There shall be in and for Niue a legislative Assembly to be called the Niue 
Assembly. 
The remaining sections of the Chapter on the legislature describe: its size; 
procedures for electing the members; qualifications for membership; procedures in 
the event of vacancies; offices of Parliament (including Speaker, Deputy Speaker, 
and Clerk); aspects of parliamentary procedure; length of the parliamentary term; 
procedures for a dissolution of Parliament; oaths of members. The Solomons' 
Constitution describes a Constituency Boundaries Commission, whose recom-
mendations (at least every ten years) are designed to safeguard "the principle that 
the number of inhabitants of each constituency shall be as nearly equal as is 
reasonably practicable" through boundary readjustments (allowing, however, for 
variations associated with population distribution, "the means of communication," 
and "ethnic affiliations"). An Electoral Commission is also established in this 
Constitution, with responsibilities over voter registration and the conduct of 
elections. 
Constitutional provisions relating to Pacific legislatures, therefore, entrench 
as fundamental law procedures, practices and institutions relating to the formation 
of the legislature as well as the exercise by it of its mandated powers and duties. 
Provisions dealing with parliamentary procedure follow those detailing electoral 
arrangements. 
Under "Legislation and Procedure in Parliament," the Solomons' Constitution 
includes: the objects of Parliament (to "make laws for the peace, order and good 
46 
government of Solomon Islands"); the format for bringing bills into effect (following 
approval by Parliament, the Governor-General gives assent, the Bill becomes law 
and is styled an "Act of Parliament," and "No law shall come into operation until it 
has been published in the Gazette"): the procedures for introducing bills in 
Parliament; the oaths to be taken by MPs; the right of Parliament to make and 
amend its own rules of procedure; the procedures for the election of a Speaker and 
Deputy Speaker; recognition of the existence of Opposition and Independent groups 
in Parliament; quorum requirements for the conduct of parliamentary business; a 
clause relating to the "privileges, immunities and powers of Parliament and its 
members"; a provision for public proceedings of Parliament except when "rules of 
procedure otherwise provide"; the timing of sessions of Parliament; voting 
procedures in Parliament; the timing of general elections; procedures for the 
dissolution of Parliament. 
This is a lengthy agenda, but it is one fulfilled in other Pacific Constitutions 
too and, in some instances (as in PNG), at considerably greater length than in the 
Solomons' example cited above. The Pacific legislatures are presided over by a 
Speaker but there is some variation in the qualifications and procedures used for his 
selection. 
For example, the Solomons' Constitution specifies that the Parliament shall 
elect a Deputy Speaker "from among its members" but a Speaker "from among 
persons who are qualified for election as a member of Parliament." Similarly, 
Niue'S Constitution provides: 
The Speaker of the Niue Assembly shall be elected to that office by an 
absolute majority of the members present and voting at a meeting of the Niue 
Assembly. Only a person who is qualified for election as a member of the 
Niue Assembly may be elected as Speaker. If any person elected as Speaker 
is, at the time of that election, a member of the Niue Assembly, he shall 
vacate his office as a member when he enters upon the duties of the Office of 
Speaker. 
Such a practice reflects the quest for absolute political neutrality in the 
presiding officer in Pacific legislatures. The Cook Islands Constitution provides 
that the Speaker must be "qualified for election as a member of the Assembly," and 
the pool of eligible people includes "members of the Assembly who are not 
Ministers" and "persons who are not members of the Assembly." 
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The Tuvalu Constitution, by contrast, requires the Speaker to be elected "by 
the members of Parliament from among their number" (excluding Ministers). 
Entirely contrary provisions are found in the Kiribati Constitution, which states 
clearly that "The Speaker shall be elected by emembers of the Maneaba from 
among persons who are not members of the Maneaba." 
Pacific Constitutions differ in details from one another in other areas as well. 
The Tuvalu Constitution stipulates that 
Parliament, unless sooner dissolved, shall continue for 4 years from the date 
of the first sitting of Parliament after any general election and shall then 
stand dissolved. 
Kiribati, the Solomon Islands, and the Marshall Islands scheciule general 
elections every four years. PNG and Fiji require new elections within 5 years, and 
the Cook Islands (through the 1981 amendments) has altered its parliamentary term 
to 5 years as well. Niue, Tonga and Western Samoa agree on a three-year term, 
while several of the legislative chambers in the bicameral Pacific polities hold new 
elections every two years. 
Many Pacific Constitutions stipulate that a new session of Parliament must 
be held within a set period of time following a general election. In Tuvalu, the 
Constitution requires that: 
A session of Parliament shall be appointed to commence within one month of 
the date prescribed for polling at any general election. 
In addition, parliamentary sessions must be held "so that a period of 12 
months does not intervene between the end of one session and the first sitting of 
Parliament in the next session." In PNG, requirements for calling Parliament into 
session are even more stringent. 
The Parliament shall be called to meet not more than 21 days after the day 
fixed for the return of the writs for a general election, and shall meet not 
less frequently than three times in each period of 12 months and, in principle, 
for not less than nine weeks in each such period. 
Pacific Constitutions are not silent either about the appropriate language to 
be used in legislative debate. The Niue Constitution states: 
The Speaker of any member of the Niue Assembly may speak in the Assembly 
either in the Niuean language or in the English language ... Every bill 
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introduced into the Niue /\ssembly and every Act shall be in the Niuean 
language and also in the English language ... the Niuean version and the 
English version of any record of proceedings in the Niuean Assembly or any 
Committee thereof ... shall be equally authentic ... 
The Niue Constitution guarantees as well that the remarks of the Speaker or 
of any member of the Assembly shall be translated into English or Niuean upon 
request, "as the case may be." In Western Samoa, the Constitution requires that 
All debates and discussions in the Legislative Assembly shall be conducted in 
the Samoan language and the English language. The Minutes and the debates 
of the Legislative Assembly, every bill introduced therein, every paper 
presented thereto, and all minutes of proceedings, minutes of evidence and 
reports of committees of the Assembly shall be in the Samoan language and 
the English language. 
The Cook Islands Constitution gives English and "the Maori language as 
spoken in Rarotonga" official status, in declaring that 
All debates and discussions in the Legislative Assembly shall be conducted in 
the Maori language as spoken in Rarotonga and also in the English language. 
The Fiji Constitution establishes the "official language" as English, but 
expressly permits "any member of either House" to "address the Chair in the House 
of which he is a member in Fijian or Hindustani." 
The Kiribati Constitution provides for an independent Salaries Tribunal "to 
review the salaries and allowances of members." The PNG Constitution establishes 
a "Parliamentary Salaries Tribunal" and a "Parliamentary Service, separate from 
the other State Services" headed by the Clerk of Parliament but responsible to the 
Speaker. 
The Judiciary 
Following the description of the executive and legislative components of 
government, Pacific Constitutions outline their country's judicial structure. The 
Niue Constitution is fairly typical of this chapter. It describes the High Court, the 
Land Court, the Land Appellate Court, and Justices of the Peace, while detailing as 
well provisions for Appeals from the High Court, procedures for the appointment 
and removal of judges, and the prescription of the appropriate judicial oath and 
oath of allegiance. It is noted too that the salary of "any Judge or Commissioner ... 
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shall not during the term of his office be reduced 
secure judicial offices from political harassment. 
.," in an effort further to 
Other polities described their judicial structures succinctly, with some 
interesting variations. The Marshalls' Constitution describes the judicial power as 
vested in "a Supreme Court, a High Court, a Traditional Rights Court, and such 
District Courts, Community Courts and other subordinate courts as are created by 
law." The Western Samoan Constitution establishes a Judicial Service Commission 
to advise the Head of State on most judicial appointments, promotions, transfers 
and dismissals. The Solomons' chapter on "The Legal System" commences with a 
reminder that Parliament "shall have particular regard to the customs, values and 
aspirations of the people of Solomon Islands." Following description of the High 
Court and the Court of Appeal, the powers of the Director of Public Prosecutions 
and the Public Solicitor ("to provide legal aid, advice and assistance to persons in 
need ..• ") are detailed as well. The Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas 
describes the "Judicial Bra,nch" (consisting of a Commonwealth Trial Court and a 
Commonwealth Appeals Court), establishes a six-year term of office for judges 
(who must be "at least thirty years of age"), develops procedures for the removal of 
judges by impeachment ("for treason, commission of a felony, corruption or neglect 
of duty"), and places limitations on the activities of judges. 
A full-time judge may not hold another compensated government position or 
engage in the practice of law. A judge may not make a direct or indirect 
financial contribution to apolitical organization or candidate, hold an 
executive office in a political organization, participate in a political 
campaign, or become a candidate for elective public office without resigning 
judicial office at least six months before becoming a candidate. 
Some Constitutions, specify retirement ages for judges as well. In the Fiji 
Constitution this is given as "sixty-two years or such higher age as may be 
prescribed by Parliament." The Palauan Constitution eclares that "All justices of 
the Supreme Court and judges of the National Court shall hold their offices during, 
good behavior. They shall be eligible for retirement upon attaining the age of 
sixty-five (65) years." Chapters on the judiciary describe, in straightforward terms, 
the national court structure and such other offices as are related to it. Procedures 
for judicial appointments and dismissals, salaries, promotions, transfers and 
appointments of justices of the peace are among the sundry matters reviewed. 
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Other judicial offices, such as prosecutor or the public defender, may also be 
described. The role of the Courts in interpreting the Constitution is also outlined, 
and a description of these provisions will follow. 
Administrative Structures, Finance' and Traditional Authority 
Pacific Constitutions diverge to some extent once the major structures of 
government have been described. All, however, include a chapter on "Finance" and 
another on "The Public Service." For example, the Fiji Constitution establishes 
"one Consolidated Fund" for "all revenues or other moneys raised or received" for 
Government purposes. Procedures for public expenditure are laid down, with 
responsibilities established for the Minister of Finance and Parliarnent in the 
review of estimates, the authorization of expenditure, withdrawals of public funds, 
and the payment of public officials' salaries. Provisions relating to the public debt 
are also included here, and an independent public office-the Auditor-
General-"not subject to the direction or control of any other person or authority" 
is constitutionally mandated as well. 
The Cook Islands and Niue Constitutions also describe a frame~ork for the 
raising and spending of public monies, each noting that "no taxes shall be imposed 
except by law." For these polities, independent scrutiny is constitutionally defined 
as a function of the Audit, Office of New Zealand. The Marshall Islands' 
Constitution provides for legislative control of public revenue and expenditure, 
Cabinet responsibility for budget proposals (to the legislature), and the establish-
ment of a General Fund with appropriate procedures for appropriations and 
withdrawals. The Palau Constitution establishes a National Treasury, and includes 
provisions for the sharing of "foreign aid" between the "national government and all 
the states in a fair and equitable manner." The FSM Constitution creates both a 
General Fund and a Foreign Assistance Fund, as well as procedures for the 
distribution of the latter so that "each state shall receive a share equal to the share 
of the national government and to the share of every other state." Budgetary 
procedures are also constitutionaUy elaborated, while the Public Auditor, although 
"independent of administrative control" except for an annual reporting require-
ment, may be removed from office "for cause" by 2/3 vote in the legislature. 
Nauru follows the pattern of constitutionally mandating taxation and 
expenditure practices too, including in addition requirements for a separate "Long 
Term Investment Fund" foreshadowing the depletion of the island's phosphate 
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deposits (its principal source of revenue). The Kiribati Constitution augments its 
statement of fundamental financial procedure and responsibility with a description 
of the legislature's Public Accounts Committee. In this manner, a parliamentary 
committee is assigned a constitutional status in the review of Government accounts 
and the investigation of unauthorized or excessive Government spending. Despite 
the role given to Parliament, and Cabinet, in the development of financial policies 
embracing taxation and public expenditure, the Pacific Constitutions each devote a 
separate Article to Finance rather than incorporating relevant provisions in 
chapters on legislative and executive powers. This editorial decision reflects the 
paramount importance which the development of accountability for the raising and 
spending of public monies has had in the evolution of democratic government. 
While some members of the public might see little difference in practice between 
"taxation without representation" and taxation with it, Pacific Constitutions 
nevertheless describe with some care the procedures and institutions involved in 
the management of public funds. 
Fiji's Constitution reserves a separate chapter as weJl for description of its 
public service (and several specialized commissions), followed in t.urn by another 
chapter exclusively for the office of Ombudsman (describing its powers, 
jurisdiction, procedures and so forth). Following elaboration of a "leadership code," 
the Solomons' Constitution describes the Ombudsman and, subsequently, several 
service commissions constituting the administrative arm of government (Public 
Service Commission, Judicial and Legal Service Commission, Police and Prisons 
Service Commission). These important provisions relate to the power to make 
appointments to senior, non-elective offices and describe their tenure of office, 
grounds for removal, appeals procedures and so forth. 
A public Service Commission is established in Tuvalu as well, with powers of 
appointment (through the Governor-General) of public officers, magistrates, and 
certain offices in the Tuvalu Police. The Cook Islands Constitution establishes "a 
Cook Islands Public Service" which is "under the control of Secretary of the 
Premier'S Department." The Niue Public Service is constitutionally described as 
well, with the Secretary to the Government described as "the permanent head of 
the Niue Public Service and the chief administrative officer of the Government of 
Niue." 
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Despite some variations in language and comprehensiveness of detail, the 
intent of the recent Pacific Constitutions is clear. The Public Service, particularly 
some of its major components, merits special constitutional attention in its own 
right. This is a departure from Constitutions drafted during earlier times, when the 
responsibilities of Government were not viewed so widely, and when permanent 
bureaucracies were not contemplated with a mingling of enthusiasm and resigna-
tion. 
Finally, many Pacific Constitutions devote special attention to "customary 
law", "traditional rights" and traditional authorities. The Cook Islands Constitution 
includes a House of Arikis, comprised of traditional authorities charged to 
"consider such matters relative to the welfare of the people of the Cook Islands as 
may be submitted to it by the Legislative Assembly for its considerati0n ••• " •. The 
Palauan Constitution describes a Council of Chiefs, established to "advise the 
President on matters concerning traditional laws, customs and their relationship to 
this Constitution and the laws of Palau." In a real sense, the American Samoan 
Senate is a House of Chiefs, with full legislative powers. The Western Samoan 
Parliament, similarly, is a powerful traditional body with full legislative powers. In 
the Marshalls, in addition to the Traditional Rights Court dealing with "questions 
relating to titles or to land rights or to other legal interests depending whoUy or 
partly on customary law and traditional practice," there is a Council of Iroij 
comprising traditional leaders, empowered to request reconsideration of "any Bill 
affecting the customary law, or any traditional practice, or land tenure; or any 
related matter." The FSM makes provision for a Chamber of Chiefs as well. 
There is, in short, a widespread consensus about the need to provide some 
kind of constitutional basis, or structure, recognizing and representing traditional 
authority. This may involve establishing a new structure or, a,lternatively, 
redefining an existing institution so as to ensure that ~reas of traditional interest 
and importance are fuUy recognized. To some extent, including a traditional 
structure within the Constitution is a symbolic gesture, as in itself this may 
contribute little to the effort to control and manage social change. The 
significance of symbolic gestures ought not be minimized, however. The 
Constitution itself may become a powerful political system' in its own right, 
particularly if its language asserts goals, establishes value commitments and 
develops institutions capable of defending and promoting a national-'c~1tural 
ldentity. 
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With land rights so central in traditional societies, not unexpectedly land 
receives some special attention in Pacific Constitutions. In the Solomons, a 
separate chapter devoted to land declares: 
The right to hold or acquire a perpetual interest in land shall vest in any 
person who is a Solomon Islander and only in such other person or persons as 
may be prescribed by. Parliament. 
The Palauan Constitution pays attention to land from a different angle. In 
addition to declaring that "No tax shall be imposed on land" (a view likely to be 
supported by New Zealand ratepayers), the Constitution reads: 
Harmful substances such as nuclear, chemical, gas or biological weapons 
intended for use in warfare, nuclear power plants, and waste materials 
therefrom, shall not be used, tested, stored, or disposed of w.ithin the 
territorial jurisdiction of Palau without the express approval of three fourths 
(3/4) of the votes cast in a referendum submitted on this specific question. 
The Micronesian State Constitutions direct their attention to land and related 
resources as well. The language of the charter of the Kosrae District Government 
(one of the states in the FSM) is evocative. 
The environment of Kosrae District, to include, but not limited to, the land, 
sea, and air, is a public trust of which all Kosraeans, living and yet unborn, 
are beneficiaries. As trustee, the Kosrae District Government is obligated to 
act in a manner calculated to assure the protection of the air, water and 
natural resources and the public trust therein from pollution, impairment or 
destruction • •• The Kosrae District Government shall promote the 
conservation and development of agricultural, marine, mineral, forest, water, 
land, and other natural resources. The District Government is empowered to 
conserve and develop Kosrae's natural beauty and objects and places of 
historical or cultural interest • Radioactive, toxic chemical, or other 
harmful substances may ·not be tested, stored, used, or disposed of within the 
jurisdiction of Kosrae District without the express approval of the District 
Government, which may be granted only in a manner to be prescribed by law. 
These citations once again underscore the innovative character of Pacific 
Constitutions when viewed against the background of comparative political studies. 
Pacific Constitutions identify a range of judicial, administrative (such as the 
Ombudsman) and traditional structures responsible for the protection of individual 
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and collective rights and resources. Certain constitutions go beyond this structural 
work by seeking to identify for special protection the natural resources of the 
country wi thin a special constitutional Article. Such constitutional craftsmanship 
skillfully identifies an important area of convergence between traditional values 
and contemporary aspirations, and goes further by giving these values and 
aspirations formal statutory expression. 
Constitutional Change--Interpretation and Amendment 
A difficulty in introducing a Constitution in societies following a parliamen-
tary model is that a document promulgating a fundamental law must bind each of 
the legal, political and governmental institutions within that society. Pacific 
constitution-makers have perceived quite clearly that the doctrine of parlia-
mentary supremacy requires some modification in such circumstances, for if 
Parliament can flout the Constitution the document itself becomes fictional. Thus 
constitutional supremacy is imperative if Pacific Parliaments are to be restrained 
from violating constitutional provisions (intentionally or otherwise). This objective 
may be somewhat easier to achieve when constitutional documents arise through 
extraordinary means (such as a convention of elected delegates, quite separate 
from· the legislature) and are ratified directly by the people. In this manner, the 
supremacy of the institutions described therein-Parliament, Cabinet, the Prime 
Minister and so on-is modified, in principle, through their description and 
definition in a document not of their own making. In such circumstances the 
Constitution, and all it contains and expresses, may more readily be regarded as the 
superior law, one embodying the will of the people as articulated directly through 
an extraordinary electoral process. 
In any event abstract arguments about the impossibility of binding Parliament 
are of little value when parliamentary democracies, existing in and of this world, 
operating under written Constitutions, can in fact be identified and examined. The 
Pacific polities whose recent constitutional experience forms the framework for 
this investigation share many political, legal and governmental institutions and 
procedures (as this review has demonstrated). All have developed written 
Constitutions with provisions for constitutional interpretation and the scrutiny of 
parliamentary performance according to constitutional criteria. This challenges 
the traditional British view that Parliament is the highest court in the land, and 
that consequently no governmental institution (such as another court) may hold an 
Act of Parliament (or its execution) invalid. Indeed this view also rules out the 
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possibility of binding Parliament, according to the language of a written 
Constitution, for the actions of one Parliament (including the adoption of such a 
Constitution) may be repudiated by its successor through a simple majority. Thus 
the Pacific constitutions following the parliamentary model constitute a significant 
departure from the older Westminster approach. 
The Solomons Constitution describes itself as "the supreme law of Solomon 
Islands" and declares further that "if any other law is inconsistent with this 
constitution, that other law shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void." But 
how is the supremacy clause to be enforced? Who will determine when an Act of 
Parliament is to be overturned as inconsistent with the Constitution? In its Bill of 
Rights, the Solomon Islands' ·Constitution states that: 
... if any person alleges that any of the provisions (of the Bill of Rights) has 
been, is being or is likely to be contravened in relation to him (or, in the case 
of a person who is detained, if any other person alleges such a contravention 
in relation to the detained person) then, without prejudice to nay other action 
with respect to the same matter which is lawfully available, that person ... 
may apply to the High Court for redress. 
Elsewhere in the Solomons' Constitution, powers are given to the High Court 
to deal with constitutional questions when petitioners have "standing" (i.e., are 
"likely to be affected" by the issue raised), although constitutional litigation in 
matters relating to parliamentary membership (already reserved to the High Court 
for decision), the Ombudsman's activities, and aspects of the Governor-General's 
role has been restricted. Apart from these areas, the High Court is empowered "to 
make a declaration" that provisions of the Constitution have been "contravened" 
and to grant "such remedy .•• as the Court considers appropriate." Thus in broad 
terms Parliament, Cabinet and the Prime Minister must ensure that their behavior 
conforms to constitutional requirements as interpreted and enforced by the High 
Court. While Parliament continues to "make the law," it is not "above" the 
fundamental constitutional law organizing the polity as a whole. 
Not surprisingly, the Tuvalu Constitution-both in its Bill of Rights and in its 
chapter on the judiciary-establishes a comparable set of relationships between the 
High Court, the Constitution and the other agencies and branches of government. 
The Tuvalu Constitution addresses the point squarely: 
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Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the High Court shall have 
original jurisdiction to hear and determine any question as to the interpreta-
tion of this Constitution. 
Powers of constitutional interpretation are assigned to the High Court in the 
Kiribati Constitution as well, in its chapters on the judiciary and the "Protection of 
Fundamental Rights and Freedoms of the Individua1." In Western Samoa, Part 
VI-"The Judiciary"-defines the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court thusly: 
... where in any proceedings before another court (except the Court of 
Appeal) a question arises as to the interpretation or effect of any provision of 
this Constitution, the Supreme Court may, on the application of any party to 
the proceedings, determine that question ... 
In addition, the Court of Appeal in Western Samoa may hear appeals from the 
Supreme Court in cases that involve "a substantial question of law as to the 
interpretation or effect of any provision of this Constitution." Moreover, Part 
II-"Fundamental Rights"-establishes that any person "may apply to the Supreme 
Court ... to enforce the rights conferred" and that, further, the Supreme Court 
"shaH have power to make all such orders as may be necessary and appropriate to 
secure to the applicant the enjoyment of any of the rights conferred." The Court 
of Appeal, once more, may make determinations on such matters following a 
decision of the Supreme Court. 
In Western Samoa, therefore, the power of the courts to be the final arbiter 
in constitutional matters is firmly established within the Constitution (despite some 
conflicts in practice with Samoan custom). In Nauru, similarly, the "Supreme Court 
shall .•. have original jurisdiction to determine any question arising under or 
involving the interpretation or effect of any provision of this Constitution." In the 
Cook Islands, as well, constitutional interpretation has been reserved to the courts, 
a practice extended under the 1981 amendments providing appeals procedures in 
cases involving "fundamental rights and freedoms." 
The American-influenced Pacific polities, not unexpectedly, prescribe broad 
judicial powers in constitutional cases. In the Marshalls, the supremacy Article 
includes a section on "Enforcement of this Constitution" which gives the "A ttorney-
General acting in the name of the people of the Marshall Islands," as well as "all 
persons directly affected by an alleged violation of this Constitution," rights "to 
complain of such violation" before "any court of general jurisdiction." In the 
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Article on the judiciary, the Supreme Court is given "final authority to adjudicate 
all cases and controversies properly brought before it ..• " 
In the FSM Constitution, the Supreme Court is described as "the highest court 
in the nation." The Supreme Court is given the power to "review cases heard in the 
national courts, and cases heard in state or local courts if they require 
interpretation of this Constitution, national law, or a treaty." Although so 
empowered, the Constitution also enjoins the Supreme Court to ensure that its 
decisions are "consistent with this Constitution, Micronesian customs and tradi-
tions, and the social and geographical configuration of Micronesia." 
Vesting powers of constitutional interpretation with the Courts follows the 
American example. In the American system, however, Supreme Court judges are 
expected to rule on constitutional matters only when these arise out of genuine 
"cases and controversies." Justices are not expected to provide legislators or chief 
executives with advisory opinions on the likely constitutionality of alternative 
courses of action. In Western Samoa, however, avoidance of hypothetical 
interpretive comment is not made easy by the following constitutional injunction: 
The Head of State, acting on the advice of the Prime Minister, may refer to 
the Supreme Court for its opinion any question as to the interpretation or 
effect of any provision of this Constitution which has arisen or appears likely 
to arise, and the Court shall pronounce its opinion on any question so referred 
to it. 
In Niue, on certain types of legislation (dealing with land, criminal procedure, 
and social matters such as marriage and divorce), the Constitution provides for 
comment by the Chief Justice upon invitation from the Niue Assembly. This is an 
invitation not easily igonored: 
Whenever • • • the Chief Justice is invited to comment on the legal, 
constitutional, and policy issues raised by any Bill or amendment, he shall as 
soon as possible, and in any case within one month after receiving the papers 
relating to the Bill or amendment, respond to that invitation ••• 
It seems clear that there is a consensus within the contemporary Pacific, 
amongst polities following a variety of governmental models, about the desirability 
of constitutionally providing the judiciary with a decisive role in the interpretation 
and elaboration of fundamental law. In every case Constitutions grant to some 
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judicial agency a final declarative power with respect to constitutional matters in 
their broadest sense. 
Constitutional language may acquire different meanings according to cir-
cumstance, and it seems clear that courts of law will play the major role in stating 
new meanings as Pacific constitutions evolve. However, while constitutions are 
intended in some respects to forestall change, by entrenching certain procedures 
and values, they normally contemplate the possibility of adaptation and revision as 
well. Thus Pacific Constitutions provide procedures whereby these documents may 
be amended. 
The Tuvalu Constitution provides one approach to constitutional change. It 
reserves the amending power to Parliament itself, subject however to a special 
majority (2/3). 
. . . Parliament may by Ordinance alter this Constitution. A bill for an 
Ordinance to alter any provision of this Constitution shall not be passed by 
Parliament unless it is supported at its second reading in Parliament by the 
votes of not less than 8 members (of 12) of Parliament. 
In Kiribati a similar principle is followed, with some modifications. The 
amending power is assigned to Parliament, and a Bill to alter "any of the provisions 
of this Constitution" must receive at least two-thirds support within Parliament. In 
addition, the amendment Act may not pass unless consideration of it is "deferred 
after its first reading .•• until the next following meeting .•• " However, 
Parliament's ability to repeal, modify, amend, suspend or violate the Constitution 
through these procedures is restricted through two other provisions. Another 
section of the Constitution is intended to protect an ethnic minority (the Banabans) 
within Kiribati, for the Article dealing with their rights may not be amended 
without the approval of the Banaba MP. 
In addition, any proposal to alter "Chapter II of this Constitution"-i.e., the 
Bill of Rights-must follow different procedures, ones intended to identify the 
"rights and freedoms" of the people as superior to the other constitutional 
components which may be more easily changed. Thus, such legislation "shall not 
come into operation unless ••. submitted to a referendum in which all persons who 
are registered as electors for the purposes of a general election shall be entitled to 
vote and unless those provisions have been supported by the votes of not less than 
two-thirds of all the persons entitled to vote in the referendum." This is a 
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significant obstacle indeed, for the designated majority for change is two-thirds of 
the eligible electorate rather than two-thirds of the participating voters. 
In the Solomons'Constitution, a two-tier approach to constitutional change is 
also introduced. In such case, bills to amend the Constitution must be clearly 
identified as having that purpose (Le., "a Bill for an Act of Parliament to alter the 
Constitution") and notice of such legislation must be given to the Speaker "at least 
four weeks before the first reading of the Bill in Parliament." Most provisions of 
the Constitution may be altered by Parliament when amending legislation receives 
the support of "not less than two-thirds of all the members of Parliament" on two 
separa te readings. However, a three-quarters vote of all the members, on two 
separate readings, is required for amending acts altering: provisions for 
constitutional change; the Bill of Rights; the chapter on "The Legal System"; 
provisions with respect to the Ombudsman; sections dealing with the electoral 
system; the position of the Auditor-General. 
In Nauru, Parliament's power to alter the Constitution is modified as in 
Kiribati and the Solomon Islands. Most constitutional amendments require "an 
. 
interval of not less than ninety days between the introduction of the proposed law 
in Parliament" and its passage, as well as approval by "not less than tw'o-thirds of 
the total number of members of Parliament." However, parliamentary efforts to 
change provisions considered to be of more fundamental importance would involve 
approval of the proposals by the public in a referendum held specifically for that 
purpose. The specified majority is "not less than two-thirds of all the votes validly 
cast." The constitutional areas <8overed by this requirement include: the 
supremacy clause; the Bill of Rights: certain Articles dealing with the President, 
the Parliament, and the timing of general elections; certain Articles dealing with 
Finance; certain citizenship provisions; certain transitional provisions (relating to 
Independence); the amending procedures. 
The Cook Islands Constitution also employs a dual approach to the amending 
task. Constitutional amendments require "at both the final vote .•• and the vote 
preceding that .•• the affirmative v·otes of not less than two-thirds of the total 
membership (including vacancies)" as well as a ninety-day gap "cooling off" period 
between the two aforementioned votes; In addition, however, changes to the Act 
establishing the Constitution, and to- two Articles of the Constitution, require-in 
addition to conformity with the procedures summarized above-support by at least 
two-thirds "of the valid votes" cast in a public referendum. The areas of 
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consti tutional change requiring public approval are: the supremacy clause; the 
declaration of the Cook Islands as "self-governing"; provisions providing for the 
exercise through "consultation" of New Zealand's responsibilities for the Cook 
Islands' "external affairs and defence"; provisions relating (in effect) to the Cook 
Islanders' position as New Zealand citizens; the position of the Queen as Head of 
State; the amending procedures themselves. 
The Niue Constitution places further limits on the legislative power to alter 
the fundamental laws. Constitutional amendment in Niue requires in every case 
parliamentary approval (by a two-thirds vote "of the total membership of the 
Assembly" in two separate votes, the latter taken "at least 13 weeks" after the 
prior vote) and approval by the electors in a special poll. In most cases, the Niue 
electorate need only approve the Assembly's proposed amendment by a majority 
vote. However, "two-thirds of the votes validly cast" is the specified majority for 
amendments to: the amending Article; the Article dealing with appointments to 
the Niue Public Service; the Article describing the "executive authority... vested 
in Her Majesty the Queen in right of New Zealand"; and sections of the Act 
establishing the Constitution and providing for self-government, continued New 
Zealand citizenship for Niueans, a continued New Zealand role in external affairs 
and defence, "a continuing responsibility of the Government of New Zealand to 
provide necessary economic and administrative assistance," "Co-operation between 
New Zealand and Niue," and the appointment of a New Zealand Representative in 
Niue. 
Elsewhere in the Pacific, the legislative role in constitutional change is more 
diminished still. In the Northern Marianas, amendments may be proposed by 
constitutional conventions assembled especially for such a purpose, the legislature 
(by a three-fourths vote of the members of each legislative chamber) or by the 
people themselves via a petition. Moreover, all proposed amendments (to become 
valid) must be approved by the voters at a referendum held in conjunction with the 
"next regular general election." Similarly, in the FSM, the people may propose, and 
must approve, all amendments to their Constitution. Moreover, an amendment is 
not accepted unless "approved by 3/4 of the votes cast ..• in each of 3/4 of the 
states." In Palau, where constitutional change may be begun by a Convention, a 
petition ("signed by twenty-five percent ••• of the registered voters"), or by 
legislative action (a "resolution adopted by not less than three-fourths .•. of the 
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members of each House"), approval requires a "majority of the votes cast... in not 
less than three-fourths 0/4-) of the states." 
Some of the Pacific Constitutions have extended their innovative approach to 
the amending provisions. Responding to recent interest in "sunset" legislation, in 
which statutes lapse after a specified period of time unless re-enacted, several of 
the newly drafted constitutions apply the logic of "sunset" laws to the Constitution 
itself. Reflecting Thomas Jefferson's view that a "perpetual Constitution" must be 
undemocratic, sapping the people's ability thoughtfully to govern themselves, 
several Pacific Constitutions require that the voters be asked, at regular intervals, 
whether they would like to see the Constitution reviewed. This approach was used 
by the French revolutionaries, in their Constitution of 1791, but despite Jefferson's 
praise for the principle it has not been very widely accepted, so that its re-
emergence in the Pacific is somewhat unexpected. 
In PNG, the Constitution provides for the establishment of a "General 
Constitutional Commission" three years after Independence to "inquire into the 
working of this Constitution." The Palau Constitution requires that 
... at least once every fifteen (15) years, the (legislature) may submit to the 
voters the question: "Shall there be a Convention to revise or 'amend the 
Constitution?" If a majority of the votes cast upon the question is in the 
affirmative, a Constitution Convention shall be convened within six (6) 
months thereafter, in a manner prescribed by law; 
In the State of Hawaii, the Constitution requires that the voters be polled, in 
a comparable manner, every ten years. In the FSM, a question identical to the one 
in the Palauan document is to be submitted to the voters every 10 years, with 
delegates to the convention to be chosen no later than the next regular election. In 
the Northern Marianas, the question reads: "Shall there be a constitutional 
convention to propose amendments to the Constitution?" This question is to be 
submitted to the people by the legislature, or the Governor, "no later than seven 
years after the effective date of this Constitution .•• " In addition, a petition to 
place this question on the ballot "at the next regular general election" can, with 
sufficient support, lead to the convening of a constitutional convention. (In either 
case, "two-thirds of the votes cast" is the specified requirement in this 
referendum.) 
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These constitutional provisions in effect make Pacific constitutional 
documents which incorporate them experimental in character. By subjecting the 
operation of their Constitution to periodic review, Pacific constitution-makers 
have erected procedures designed to prevent the Constitution itself from becoming 
unchangeable, an undemocratic instrument, an obstacle to democratic government 
rather than a framework for its development. Indeed most Pacific polities grant 
their peoples a greater role on constitutional issues than citizens of the United 
States of America (for example) presently enjoy (at least in relation to the central 
government). It is evident therefore that the introduction of a written Constitution 
in newly independent and self-governing Pacific polities has been seized upon as an 
exceptionally promising opportunity for a general enlargement of the publlc's civic 
responsibill ties. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES: A SUMMING UP 
Most of the Pacific Constitutions adopted recently arise out of broadly 
comparable political circumstances. The Constitutions of Papua New Guinea, the 
Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, Kiribati, Western Samoa, Vanuatu, and Nauru were drafted 
to define the political administrative and judicial institutions of newly independent 
countries. The Cook Islands and Niue are governed under constitutional documents 
which reflect their continuing relationship with New Zealand. In Micronesia, the 
American-governed trust territory has fragmented, leading to the emergence of 
four political entities each equipped with institutions defined by constitutional 
means. These entities-all of them more or less self-governing, none of them fully 
autonomous as they remain associated with the United States through different 
agreements-have elaborated constitutional frameworks which differ significantly 
from one another and from the other Pacific states. Elsewhere in the Pacific there 
are constitutional documents associated with islands differing markedly in their 
political status. Guam-an American territory-has an "Organic Act." American 
Samoa-another American territory less integrated into the American 
system-nevertheless has a Constitution of its own. The French possessions of New 
Caledonia and French Polynesia are governed under statutes defining their 
institutions' powers within the French political network. 
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The Pacific is marked therefore by constitutional diversity, but it is a 
diversity which reflects the different political status of Pacific polities as well as 
their differing responses to the problems of governmental organization. In most 
instances, the constitutions -reflect the sentiments of the people in the entity 
concerned shaped, in turn, by the circumstances by which independence, or self-
government, has been achieved. These are historical moments which have now 
passed. 
The general shape of the documents which have emerged from these 
collective deliberations should be clear. To review, these constitutional documents 
include: a preamble; a clause establishing the supremacy of the Constitution; a Bill 
of Rights; separate Articles describing the Head of State, the Executive (Prime 
Minister and Cabinet), the Legislature (Parliament), the Judiciary, the Public 
Service, and possibly other institutions as well; provisions for constitutional 
interpretation and change. 
The processes by which these constitutions came to be introduced may be 
summarized as well. Several of them were enacted by the British Parliament, as 
part of the Independence package. In certain polities, the legislature has played 
the central role in drafting, and approving, the document. Elsewhere special 
conventions, comprising delegates popularly elected, have been assembled to draft 
constitutional documents which have been, in turn, submitted to the voters for 
their approval. 
_ The process l;>y which a constitution is elaborated is important both legally 
a:nd symbolically. The selection of a particular procedure may depend on whether 
the proponents of a Constitution seek to introduce change or to provide an obstacle 
to change (by giving established structures and procedures constitutional expres-
sion). The process of constitutional draftsmanship, however, is only partially 
involved with the choice of procedure. Pacific Constitutions, while heterogeneous 
in their details, follow identifiable patterns because they draw upon a long tradition 
in constitution-making. For the most part, their binding procedures are set out in 
language at once elegant and concise. Clarity of writing and a felicity of 
expression appear to be gifts valued highly among constitutional authors, and 
rightly so. For a document identifying the nation's aspirations, defining its 
collective institutions, and elaborating its fundameJlltal commitments in law and 
politics, is both legal tool and educational instrument, and needs to be written with 
both ends in view. 
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The introduction of a written constitution inaugurates an entire sequence of 
poli tical, legal and social changes. 2 The way in which the poll tical struggle is 
articulated and waged alters dramatically when a legally enforceable constitution 
frame.s the battle. Certain major political customs and conventions acquire the 
near-permanence they merit, while in certain instances the formulation of a 
constitution may provide the opportunity for anomalous attitudes and inadequate 
procedures to be overcome (or, alternatively, to be entrenched still more deeply 
into a nation's political life). 
Among the consequences of Pacific constitutions may be included, as well, an 
excessive reliance upon litigation, important delays in decision-making, and a 
transfer of authority from elected representatives (and from the general public) to 
lawyers and judges (in each case, often non-indigenous). Nevertheless, at this point 
in the political evolution of the Pacific, it would be premature other than to view 
the Pacific Constitutions, embodying a respect for civil liberties and the 
procedures of democratic choice-making, as well as a due regard for the 
democratic heritage and more deep-rooted traditional values, as anything other 
than a positive and beneficial development. 
Notes 
1. Copies of Pacific Constitutions, quoted herein, were obtained from a variety 
of sources, among the most important being the United States Government 
(Department of the Interior) and the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. 
2. See Stephen Levine, The New Zealand Political System (Sydney: George 
Allen &: Unwin, 1979), pp. 28-30. Features of Pacific islands' constitutions 
were discussed in a quite different context in Stephen Levine, A Constitution 
and Bill of Rights for New Zealand-An Idea Whose Time Has Come?, Public 
Sector Research Papers, Volume II, Number 4, 1981. An important influence 
in shaping the direction of this inquiry into Pacific constitutions has been the 
work of Professor Ivo Duchacek. See his Comparative Federalism: The 
Territorial Dimensions of Politics (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 
1970) and his Power Maps: Comparative Politics of Constitutions (Santa 
Barbara, California: ABC-Clio, 1973). 
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